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President’s  Column       
 
In November 2015 the Movement Disorder Society (MDS) revised the diag-
nostic criteria for Parkinson’s disease (PD) (Postuma et al 2015).  In contrast to the 
publication of DSM-5 in 2013, there was not much fanfare.  Parkinson’s disease, 
like most mental disorders, cannot be definitively diagnosed in living persons.  
Also like mental disorders, it presents differently across individuals, and sympto-
matically overlaps with other motor and cognitive impairments (most notably 
Lewy body disease).  The MDS specifies that the new diagnostic criteria are in-
tended to improve research, but that they may be used for clinical purposes as 
well, just as the DSM diagnostic criteria have multiple purposes.   
The new PD criteria depart from DSM in using essential criteria, supportive 
criteria, “absolute exclusion criteria,” and “red flags” to create tiers of diagnostic 
confidence.  The clinical diagnosis of PD requires all essential criteria 
(bradykinesia together with resting tremor and/or rigidity).  It requires at least 2 of 
4 supportive criteria (response to dopamine treatment, presence of levodopa-
produced dyskinesia, resting tremor of a limb rather than just the distal extremity, 
and cardiac sympathetic denervation or olfactory dysfunction).  For PD to be 
“clinically established,” there must be no absolute exclusion criteria, and no red 
flags. Absolute exclusion criteria are rule-out criteria, those that suggest a different 
diagnosis, such as cerebellar disease, neurodegenerative disease, or parkinsonism 
as a side effect of treatment with certain medications.  
Red flags are clinical findings that diminish confidence in the diagnosis of 
PD.  These tend to be departures from the typical course of disease progression, 
physical distribution of symptoms, or severity of symptoms.  The presence of red 
flags does not preclude the diagnosis of PD, as long as there are no more than two.  
Each red flag requires a supportive criterion to “counterbalance” it. In such a case 
there is less diagnostic confidence, so the diagnosis is “clinically probable” PD 
rather than “clinically established” PD. 
 The MDS paper does not specify how tiered diagnosis is to be applied.  Alt-
hough I am intrigued by the approach, especially the aspect of explicitly balancing 
supporting and contradictory clinical evidence, I wonder whether this strategy 
might apply to psychiatry. Psychiatry has always tried to maximize the certainty 
and precision of diagnosis, which is necessary to justify many psychiatric treat-
ments.  Despite efforts in the 1960s and 1970s to make psychiatric diagnosis more 
reliable, research cohorts comprised only of “clinically established” mental disor-
ders are symptomatically heterogeneous even among unambiguous cases of the 
same mental illness.  Clinically, it is unclear to me what purpose two tiers would 
serve.  Would probable bipolar disorder be less stigmatizing than established bipo-
lar disorder?  Would patients with established ADHD be eligible for insurance 
(Continued on page 23) 
From the Editor 
 
The papers gathered in this issue 
of the Bulletin represent a sampling of 
the presentations at the AAPP Annual 
Meeting last May in Toronto. That 
meeting was unique in that there was 
no meeting theme. The papers in this 
issue consequently show the diversity 
one would expect from an open meet-
ing. 
 In “Mental Illness, Freedom,    and  
Development,” Jeffrey Bedrick takes 
up the epidemiological finding that 
some mental illnesses, especially de-
pression,  are less frequent in less de-
veloped countries than in developed 
ones. This flies in the face of the ex-
pectation that mental illness will follow 
the path of poverty — the more poverty 
the more illness. He considers many 
explanatory factors and then suggests 
that the answer may involve what he 
describes as the degree of ‘positive 
freedom’. On the one hand traditional 
societies may afford less freedom but 
the social cohesion and support  that 
protect against  depression. On the oth-
er hand, developed countries allow and 
promise more freedom of opportunity, 
but in fact may frustrate that promise 
through poverty, lack of opportunity, 
and resultant childhood neglect, all of 
which can result in depression.   
 In “Is it Ethical to Change Memo-
ries to Treat Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder (PTSD)?,” Miguel Vilaro 
presents an Aristotelian challenge to 
the Cartesian dualism that besets offi-
cial psychiatry. Representatives of the 
latter would of course retort that they 
have rejected Cartesianism, but they do 
so by privileging the materialist side of 
Descartes’s dualism  and leaving the 
mind as an unembodied  ghost in the 
machine. Building on Aristotle’s no-
tion of the mind as the form of the 
body, Vilaro directs this position to-
ward a new understanding of posttrau-
matic stress.  
 Chandra Kavanagh’s “Accom-  
modation or Cure: A Synthesis of Neu-
rodiverse and Cure Theory Recommen-
 
dations for Autism Action” and Robert Kruger’s  “Social Epistemology in High-
functioning Autism (Asperger's Disorder)” can be read together, as both address 
the need for accommodating to austistic difference in a just society. Kavanagh 
invokes the capability approach of Martha Nussbaum while Kruger invokes the 
epistemic injustice theory of Mirander Fricker. Despite their different languages, 
the positions of Nussbaum and Fricker, as well as those of Kavanagh and Kruger, 
are so similar that it’s difficult to specify the differences. One clue might be their 
respective attitudes toward Applied Behavioral Analysis (ABA). Kruger is in favor 
of this treatment modality, while  Kavanagh is concerned that it emphasizes  treat- 
(Continued on page 23) 
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A number of carefully designed 
and executed studies, most notably 
those performed by the World Health 
Organization as part of its Mental 
Health Surveys project, have found 
different rates of various psychiatric 
illnesses in the countries in which 
the surveys have been done (Kessler 
et al., 2007, Kessler and Ustun, 
2008).  This, in itself, was not sur-
prising.  What was surprising was 
that for many disorders, such as ma-
jor depression, “the estimated life-
time prevalence was higher in high-
income (14.6%) than low- to middle-
income (11.1%) countries t=5.7, 
P<0.001)” (Bromet et al., 2011). 
This is surprising as there is much 
research showing that poverty, which 
one might suspect to be more com-
mon in the low- to middle-income 
countries, and food insecurity are 
linked to the development of a num-
ber of mental disorders, including 
major depression (Manseau 2015, 
Compton 2015, both in Compton and 
Shim, 2015).  How can we explain 
these seemingly surprising findings? 
Findings of this sort are some-
times written off as being due to 
higher rates of diagnosis in the de-
veloped world.  If the findings were 
just based on rates of diagnosis and 
treatment in the various countries, 
this might well explain the findings.  
But the WHO studies were based on 
community samples, not samples of 
those seeking treatment, and were 
carefully designed to try to minimize 
cultural biases and stigma, though 
obviously no study can do this com-
pletely (Kessler et al., 2007, Kessler 
and Ustun, 2008). 
The finding is sometimes as-
sumed to be an example of so-called 
“first world Problems,” with the im-
plication that in countries where 
basic needs are not as easily met, 
people do not have the “luxury” of 
having these lesser psychiatric ill-
ness, which are thought of as the 
province of the “worried well.”  Ma-
jor depression, however, is ranked by 
the World Health Organization as the 
fourth leading cause of disability 
worldwide, and the World Health 
Organization projects that it will be 
he second leading cause of disability 
by 2020 (Bromet et al., 2011).  This 
does not seem like a matter of the 
“worried well.” 
Some might argue that there is 
no problem here, and that just as sick-
le cell anemia or Tay-Sachs disease 
are overrepresented in certain popula-
tions because of genetic factors, that 
the genetic vulnerability to major 
depression, and to certain other psy-
chiatric illness, varies across popula-
tions in a way that explains the sur-
vey findings.  I think we should be 
careful about accepting such an ex-
planation, however, in the absence of 
any known genetic factor that is dis-
tributed in this way.  In fact, what is 
known about the vulnerabilities to 
major depression suggests that genet-
ic factors only account for about one-
third of the vulnerability, with envi-
ronmental factors accounting for the 
other two-thirds (Saveanu and 
Nemeroff, 2012).  Further, there is 
evidence that the incidence of major 
depression has been increasing over a 
time span not consistent with changes 
in underlying genetic vulnerabilities, 
and so there is reason to believe that 
social or environmental factors are 
playing a role in the increasing inci-
dence of depression (Cross-National 
Collaborative Group, 1992; Andersen 
et al., 2011), which at least opens the 
possibility that they may be playing a 
role in cross-national and cross-
cultural differences as well.  One of 
the studies that examined the chang-
ing rate of major depression found 
that while there was an overall in-
crease in the rates of major depres-
sion over time over all countries, the 
magnitude of the increase varied sig-
nificantly by country (Cross-National 
Collaborative Group, 1992).  The 
authors of that study write that this 
suggests “the rates in these countries 
may have been affected by differing 
historical, social, economic, or bio-
logical environmental events” (Cross-
National Collaborative Group, 1992).  
They go on to suggest that “linking of 
demographic, epidemiologic, eco-
nomic, and social indices by country 
to these changes may clarify environ-
mental conditions that influence the 
rates of major depression” (Cross-
National Collaborative Group, 1992).   
Within the United States, studies 
have shown increasing levels of anxi-
ety over the years from 1952-1993 
(Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009 Citing 
Jean Twenge).  Major depression thus 
does not seem to be a statistical fluke in 
this regard. 
One factor that has often been 
thought to be important here is social 
support, and an associated sense of 
belonging to a community.  Thus a 
recent study showed lower rates of ma-
jor depression in rural dwellers versus 
urban dwellers in Canada, and this was 
associated with a stronger sense of 
community belonging among the rural 
dwellers  (Romans, Cohen, and Forte, 
2011).  (Interestingly, this same study 
did not show an excess of anxiety dis-
orders in urban dwellers.)  It is thought 
that there might be a greater sense of 
social support, belonging to a commu-
nity, and having a defined social role in 
more traditional societies, and it is sug-
gested that the low- to middle-income 
countries in the WHO studies tend to 
be more traditional societies, where 
there has been less social dislocation by 
urbanization.  Where population mobil-
ity has increased, people no longer live 
in settings where they are known as for 
themselves, and social status comes to 
play a larger role in their standing in 
society (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009). 
Further, there is evidence that 
within a country mental illness is 
“more common among the poor than 
the rich. As a result, it often looks as if 
the effect of higher incomes and living 
standards is to lift people out of these 
problems.  However, when we make 
comparisons between different socie-
ties, we find that these social problems 
have little or no relation to levels of 
average incomes in a socie-
ty” (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009).  The 
argument is thus that once a minimal 
standard of living, which ensures the 
basic necessities of life, has been 
achieved that social economic inequali-
ty rather than poverty per se is what 
accounts for these effects with people 
at the lower end of the scale suffering 
from the inequality.  It has been argued 
that “Greater inequality seems to 
heighten people’s social evaluation 
anxieties by increasing the importance 
of social status”  (Wilkinson and 
Pickett, 2009).  It is worth noting, that 
Wilkinson and Pickett find that ine-
quality has a lesser effect on major 
depression than it does on anxiety dis-
orders, though it still seems to have a 
significant effect, according to their 
data (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009). 
Unfortunately, inequality does not 
seem an explanation for the WHO sur-
vey results.  The countries that the 
WHO surveys, following the World 
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Bank, classify as less developed actual-
ly have very high rates of income ine-
quality, including the countries ranked 
the second and third most unequal in 
the world at one point.   It is hard to see 
how to make this consistent with the 
findings Wilkinson and Pickett 
(Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009) bring 
together on the harmful role of inequal-
ity in more developed societies. 
It may be that we need to view the 
results from a somewhat different per-
spective to truly make sense of them, 
though the perspective I am suggesting 
is one that is theoretical and speculative 
at this point.  Despite that, I think it has 
some features that make it worth con-
sidering. 
In a series of papers that I have 
delivered at previous AAPP and INPP 
conferences, I have begun to explore 
the idea that psychiatric illnesses as 
mental illnesses involve disorders of 
freedom.  How might this conception 
help us here? 
I would suggest that certain psy-
chiatric illnesses are less common in 
less developed countries than in more 
developed countries because more de-
veloped countries actually offer greater 
degrees of freedom to individuals than 
do less developed countries.  The social 
stability that is thought to be more 
common in less developed countries 
may offer more social support than is 
found in the more developed countries, 
but it may also limit the life choices 
and trajectories available to the mem-
bers of those societies.  While this lack 
of choices, of opportunities, is some-
times seen as the negative side of the 
stability and social cohesion shown by 
these societies, it may have yet another 
side to it. 
It is, perhaps, worth saying a little 
more about what I mean by freedom as 
I use the concept here.  While I cannot 
give a full explication of the concept of 
freedom, it should be clear that I do not 
just mean what some have called nega-
tive freedom, or freedom from con-
straint (Berlin, 1958).  I am including 
the notion of positive freedom, broadly 
construed as the individual’s actual 
capacity to perform a certain act, or 
bring a particular project to fruition.  
But freedom also has a broader applica-
tion.  Thus I would argue that societies 
in which women can serve in the mili-
tary, same sex couples can marry, a 
woman can be the political leader, and 
men can stay home to take care of the 
children, to give just a few examples, 
offer more freedom, are freer than soci-
eties in which those things are not 
possibilities or cannot, perhaps, even 
be imagined.  I have listed a number 
of examples related to sex and gender 
roles, as these examples may be easy 
for us to see.  What we might not be 
able to see are the ways in which our 
society also restricts freedom to the 
extent that there are possibilities that 
it, and we who live in it, cannot even 
imagine.  Hegel wrote that the Owl of 
Minerva takes flight only at dusk, 
though he also thought that the nation
-state of his time represented the full-
est possible flowering of freedom.  
And it is of course possible, if not 
probable, that while the developed 
countries offer many possibilities that 
less developed countries do not offer, 
they may have lost the ability to im-
agine certain possibilities that are 
clearly seen in those countries that 
are thought of as less developed. 
If we think that depression, and 
some of the anxiety disorders per-
haps, may relate to frustrated desires 
and expectations, to life projects that 
have not been successful, we may see 
that there are more ways for things to 
go wrong the more opportunities and 
options you have.  Poverty and ine-
quality may come into play here.  If 
your society leads you to believe that 
certain opportunities ought to be open 
to you, but in fact because of poverty 
and inequality they aren’t, this might 
lead to depression - or crime, sub-
stance use, or political activism.  The 
factors that might lead to depression 
rather than political activism remain 
to be identified and understood.  One 
such factor, though clearly not the 
only one, might be the effects of 
childhood neglect, abuse or other 
trauma, which has been clearly recog-
nized as tied to increased levels of 
various adult mental illnesses 
(Kessler et al., 2010; Saveanu and 
Nemeroff, 2012).  While there are no 
doubt complex psychological and 
neurochemical factors involved in 
(mediating) these effects one compo-
nent of the effect of such trauma or 
neglect might surely be the effect that 
it has on the child’s perception of 
basic freedom and capabilities.  If 
early in life you are made to feel that 
you do not have a choice in what hap-
pens to you, and that you have no 
power to change what is being done 
to you, that lack of a sense of real 
freedom might influence how you 
react to later impediments or set-
backs. 
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This way of thinking about things 
might also help to explain why some 
mental disorders differ in prevalence 
across societies while others, such as 
schizophrenia, seem to occur across 
different societies at nearly equal prev-
alence rates.  While genetics might 
again be thought of as the answer, it 
would not explain why the gene for 
schizophrenia is preserved across soci-
eties as John Nash pointed out in a talk 
to the APA some years ago.  He sug-
gested that schizophrenia was linked to 
creativity, and that creativity offered 
sufficient survival advantages, that the 
genes responsible for it, even if linked 
to a disease like schizophrenia, would 
themselves survive.  Another way of 
framing the answer is to say that schiz-
ophrenia involves a disorder of free-
dom that is so basic that the freedom 
involved is present in any human socie-
ty. 
The elites in the less developed 
countries might well feel that they 
have, or should have, all of the oppor-
tunities open to them that are open to 
the members of more developed socie-
ties, but poverty or inequality are not 
likely to stand in the way of their ac-
complishing their goals or projects.  
The distress caused by the constraints 
of traditional social roles on the choic-
es, the freedom, of those in elite posi-
tions in such less developed countries 
has long been a plot of novels, plays, 
and operettas, and I do not mean to 
minimize these conflicts.  But the prob-
lems posed are different than those 
posed by poverty and inequality. 
Do the majority of those living in 
less developed countries really not see 
the choices available in the developed 
world as being available to them?  
While I don’t have empirical evidence 
to answer this , works of literature and 
film suggest that this is the case. 
Higher rates of certain mental ill-
nesses in a society might thus be a 
mark of greater freedom offered by that 
society, as well as of societal problems 
that seem to put that freedom out of 
reach for some members of the society.  
If this is the case, the political as well 
as therapeutic goal is to find a way to 
maintain the freedoms offered while 
minimizing the obstacles to the full 
enjoyment of those freedoms, while 
recognizing that the expansion of free-
dom may come with certain risks as 
well as benefits. 
Why should we think that this way 
of thinking about things adds anything 
to the more usual ways that these ques-
tions are usually conceptualized and 
investigated?  One central reason are 
the arguments for generally thinking 
of mental illness in this way, which I 
do not have time to repeat here.  The 
other reason, of course, is that adum-
brated in this paper, that is, that the 
usual ways of thinking about these 
issues have left us with more ques-
tions than answers, or with answers 
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Accommodation or Cure: A 
Synthesis of Neurodiverse and 
Cure Theory Recommenda-
tions for Autism Action  
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 As a result of vocal autism activists 
pushing against traditional views of 
autism, there is a bilateral debate that 
reflects a deeper philosophical divide 
between medical and social definitions 
of disability. Both sides seek to deter-
mine the manner in which autistics and 
their communities view autism, and 
thus influence the manner in which 
cures or treatments are sought, dis-
pensed and taken up. One side of this 
debate, which I will call the cure theo-
ry approach, seeks treatments that will 
eradicate or at least minimize autistic 
symptoms. The philosophical position 
that lies behind this objective is that 
autistic differences, particularly dis-
ruptive or harmful autistic differences, 
ought to be removed. The other side of 
the debate, which I will call the neuro-
diverse perspective, seeks to explain 
the suffering associated with autistic 
difference as relationally determined, 
rather than a result of defect. The neu-
rodiversity movement recommends 
educating autistics and their communi-
ties regarding how to fully accommo-
date autistic differences. The underly-
ing philosophical commitment of the 
neurodiverse perspective is that it is in 
the best interests of autistics and their 
communities to accommodate differ-
ences, rather than seek treatments that 
encourage conformity.  
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 I will argue that these two sides are 
not mutually exclusive. Furthermore, a 
synthesis of these two viewpoints can 
address the contentions that both sides 
raise, while maintaining their assets. 
The neurodiverse point that a just com-
munity ought to accommodate autistic 
difference makes it possible for cure 
theory to investigate which aspects of 
autistic difference need to be cured 
with medical science, and which as-
pects can be resolved by relational 
means. At the same time, if proponents 
of neurodiversity can accept that it is 
possible for autistic difference to in-
fringe on the rights of others in a way 
that accommodation cannot resolve, 
then cures and minimizing treatments 
that can prevent such infringement 
have a place in autism activism. This 
synthesis garners the maximum capa-
bilities that the expression of autistic 
differences can offer, and maintains the 
freedom for all community members to 
actualize their capabilities. 
 Given the neurodiverse perspective 
on autism, and the social model of disa-
bility upon which it is founded, the 
recommendations for action regarding 
autism are a rejigging of community 
and relational norms, in order to ac-
commodate autistic difference. From 
the neurodiverse perspective, the chal-
lenges associated with autism largely 
result from oppressive social norms and 
the miscommunication and mispercep-
tion that results from social relations 
wherein the participants have vastly 
different and unvoiced expectations of 
each other. The neurodiversity move-
ment demands accommodation for au-
tistic difference, not just because it has 
the possibility to be beneficial for both 
autistics and their communities, but as 
a basic requirement of a just society.  
 Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities 
theory can provide a defense of the 
neurodiversity movement’s demands 
for the accommodation of autistic dif-
ference. If, as Nussbaum argues, justice 
requires the equality of capabilities that 
would otherwise lead to a deficiency of 
dignity and self-respect, and the ine-
quality of capabilities that is caused by 
not accommodating autistic difference 
results in a deficiency of self-respect, 
then justice requires the accommoda-
tion of autistic difference. In order to 
proceed with this argument it is neces-
sary to outline three of Nussbaum’s 
concepts, capabilities, human dignity, 
and just society. In her article “Creating 
Capabilities” Nussbaum claims that 
capabilities are “the answers to the 
question ‘What is this person able to 
do and to be?’” (Nussbaum 2011, 20) 
This question is not asking, what will 
a given person or group of people do? 
Nor is it asking, what possibilities are 
theoretically open to a person or 
group of people? Rather capabilities 
are the “substantial freedoms” (Ibid) 
that it is feasible for a person to 
achieve. While Nussbaum discusses a 
large number of possible capabilities, 
she tentatively settles on ten central 
capabilities that must be ensured to a 
minimum threshold level in order to 
preserve human dignity.  
 Nussbaum’s concept of human 
dignity relies on the premise that “All 
[people] deserve equal respect from 
laws and institutions.” (Nussbaum 
2011,31) For Nussbaum human dig-
nity is founded on the assumption of 
equal dignity. Ensuring equal treat-
ment from laws and institutions 
comes as a result of ensuring a mini-
mum threshold of equality of central 
capabilities. In her article on “The 
Basic Capabilities of People with 
Cognitive Disabilities” Nussbaum 
writes, “Equality of capability is an 
essential social goal where the ab-
sence of equality would be connected 
with a deficit in dignity and self-
respect…it is the equal dignity of 
human beings that demands recogni-
tion.” (Nussbaum 2009, 335) The 
minimum threshold of equality of 
capabilities is defined by ensuring the 
equality of all capabilities that would 
otherwise result in the loss of human 
dignity. Thus, human dignity is pro-
tected as a result of ensuring basic 
capabilities, and the appropriate 
threshold of basic capabilities is de-
cided based on the requirements of 
human dignity.  
 It is the condition of protecting 
human dignity, in terms of determin-
ing and ensuring a threshold level of 
basic capabilities, which determines 
whether a society is just. Nussbaum 
argues that “the political goal for all 
human beings in a nation ought to be 
the same: all should get above a cer-
tain threshold level of combined ca-
pacity, in the sense not of coerced 
functioning but of substantial free-
dom to choose and to 
act.” (Nussbaum 2011, 24) If a com-
munity is just, then it is the responsi-
bility of that community to work to-
ward ensuring that every citizen has 
the capacity to meet a threshold level 
of human dignity. Human dignity is 
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each of which must be ensured to a 
threshold level in order for a communi-
ty to be just. These include the capacity 
for life, bodily health, bodily integrity 
and so on (Ibid, 33-34).      
 If it is the case that accommodating 
autistics maintains a threshold level for 
one of these central capacities that is 
not maintained by cure-based treat-
ment, then there is support for the no-
tion that neurodiversity based recom-
mendations for autism action are more 
just than cure based recommendations.  
 Proponents of neurodiversity argue 
that when autistic people are subjected 
to minimizing treatments in order to 
cope with their autistic difference in-
stead of being accommodated, then the 
requirements for human dignity are not 
being met. The central capacity that is 
being infringed upon when autistics are 
subjected to treatments that modify 
their authentic expressions in order to 
encourage a more typical expression is 
what Nussbaum calls the central capac-
ity for senses, imagination and thought. 
This basic capability, fundamental to 
human dignity, consists of “being able 
to use the senses to imagine, think and 
reason – and to do these things in a 
truly ‘human’ way, a way informed and 
cultivated by an adequate educa-
tion.” (Ibid, 33) The just community 
must ensure that all of its citizens have 
the capability to explore their own, 
unique thoughts. To be educated in 
such a way that allows access to one’s 
own thoughts and imagination is a re-
quirement for this capability and mi-
nority members of the community have 
a right not to be indoctrinated into a 
style of thinking forced on them by the 
majority. 
 The just community must ensure 
that all of its citizens have the capabil-
ity to explore their own, unique 
thoughts, and to be educated in such a 
way that allows access to one’s own 
thoughts and imagination. Not to be 
educated in such a way that some citi-
zens are indoctrinated into a style of 
thinking that is taken up by other citi-
zens. When autistic people are educat-
ed using tactics like, for instance ABA 
therapy, that seek to bring their behav-
ior closer to species-typical behavior, 
they are educated to deny their own 
way of thinking, imagining and react-
ing in the world, and rather they are 
indoctrinated into a species-typical way 
of being. An autistic person who has 
undergone such treatment cannot be 
said to reach a minimum threshold for 
thought or imagination, because all of  
their access to thought and imagina-
tion is mediated by systematic repres-
sion of the autistic person’s spontane-
ous characteristics often from a 
young age.   
 Essential to this central capability 
is “being able to use imagination and 
thought in connection with experienc-
ing and producing works and events 
of one’s own choice.” (Ibid) When 
autistic difference is excluded from 
the community, or forced into inau-
thentic “normalcy,” the autistic is 
prevented from engaging in this re-
quirement of human dignity. While 
arguably the autistic may retain some 
capacity for imagination and thought, 
which has only been minimally co-
erced by treatment designed to have 
the autistic fit community expecta-
tions, what is produced from those 
thoughts, namely behavior that dis-
plays autistic difference, is consid-
ered unacceptable and minimized, 
even if the behavior is not harmful. 
On the other hand, the behavior that 
is produced by typical imagination is 
largely tolerated, insofar as it is not 
harmful. Not accommodating autism, 
and choosing minimizing treatment 
and the search for a cure as the only 
course of action, leads to a fundamen-
tal inequality in access to using one’s 
imagination to produce “works and 
events of one’s own choice.” (Ibid) 
Unequal access to a central capability 
is an affront to human dignity, the 
maintenance of human dignity is a 
requirement of a just society and thus, 
the refusal to accommodate autistic 
difference is unjust.      
 If we are to meet the essential goal 
of a just society, to protect equality of 
capability in cases where inequality 
connects to a loss of human dignity, 
then we are required to ensure accom-
modation for autistic difference. 
Thus, proponents of neurodiversity 
argue that maximizing the capabilities 
of autistic people by creating room 
for autistic difference through more 
inclusive social norms and communi-
ty education “is not a matter of chari-
ty but one of entitlement and basic 
justice.” (Nussbaum 2009, 340)  
 Despite the virtues of this position 
it is vulnerable to a significant cri-
tique, accommodation can only go so 
far before other community members 
face the injustice of having their hu-
man dignity infringed upon. Consider 
an occasion when autistic difference 
transgresses the central capabilities of 
the members of his community and 
accommodation cannot resolve these 
challenges. In such a case the propo-
nent of neurodiversity can still claim 
that the suffering associated with autis-
tic difference is relationally deter-
mined, but there is no longer a set of 
recommendations for action to address 
this problematic expression of autistic 
difference.  If it is possible to prevent 
the infringement of the central capabil-
ities of any community member, then it 
is just for the community to take action 
in order to ensure the central capabili-
ties of its members. Therefore, if mini-
mizing autistic difference through 
treatments or a cure prevents the in-
fringement of anyone’s central capabil-
ities, then it would seem to be just to 
take that action.     
 So, proponents of neurodiversity 
argue that the just course of action in 
coping with autistic difference is to 
accommodate. However, when accom-
modation becomes ethically-fraught 
because it will infringe on the human 
dignity of others neurodiverse recom-
mendations for action based on a social 
model of disability fail to provide guid-
ance for taking just action. On the other 
hand we have the cure theory’s view of 
autism, and the medical model of disa-
bility upon which it relies. The recom-
mendation for action suggested on this 
view is that autistic difference ought to 
be homogenized, not accommodated. 
While this provides a solution to the 
problem of autistic difference that in-
fringes on the human dignity of other 
community members the problem asso-
ciated with said view is that autistic 
difference is treated as entirely prob-
lematic, and thus all autistic difference, 
even difference that is only problemat-
ic as a result of an inflexible communi-
ty, is minimized.  
 Proponents of the cure-based theory 
of autism argue in favor of the search 
for a cure as the central recommenda-
tion for action for autistics, with work-
ing toward treatments that minimize 
autistic behaviours as an auxiliary goal. 
In 2011 Barnes and McCabe wrote an 
article that asks, whether “we should 
welcome a cure” for autism “should 
one just fall into our laps.” (Barnes and 
McCabe 2012, 255) Though this article 
does not adduce an active search for a 
cure for autism, it illustrates “the quali-
ty of life” argument that is frequently 
used to defend the search for cure or 
minimizing treatments for autism.  
 The quality of life argument in fa-
vour of welcoming a cure for autism is 
as follows: if it is the case that autism 
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decreases quality of life, and the re-
moval of autism through a cure would 
increase quality of life, then we ought 
to welcome a cure. Barnes and McCa-
be exhibit an impressive list of all the 
ways that the quality of life of autistics 
is diminished as a result of autistic 
characteristics. The list can be reduced 
to two categories: first, social dysfunc-
tion and subsequent exclusion or isola-
tion, second, “unique sensory charac-
teristics” (Ibid, 268) that can make 
some autistics sensitive to stimuli like 
light and sound. If the removal of au-
tism also removes these challenges, 
then this provides a good reason to 
welcome a cure. 
 Barnes and McCabe argue that the 
only possible answer to the quality of 
life argument is if “society is likely to 
start providing accommodations that 
will eliminate any negative im-
pact.”(Ibid, 266) While the likelihood 
of whether society will start providing 
accommodations for autistics is rele-
vant to the question, “ought we to wel-
come a cure for autism if one fell into 
our laps?” the question of likelihood is 
not relevant to the question what ought 
to be the central recommendation for 
coping with autistic difference. In fact, 
given my question, the quality of life 
argument supports accommodation just 
as much as it supports the active search 
for a cure. Although the challenges 
listed by Barnes and McCabe, which 
lower the quality of life of autistics, 
could all be overcome if a cure to au-
tism was found, many of these chal-
lenges can be overcome by creating 
more inclusive societal norms and ex-
pectations. For instance, if a communi-
ty were to stretch the boundaries of 
what is now considered socially ac-
ceptable, and fully include those whose 
otherwise harmless behavior is current-
ly considered “social dysfunc-
tion,” (Ibid, 267) this eliminates the 
problem of social exclusion or isola-
tion that would otherwise lower the 
quality of life of autistics. Even if the 
boundaries of what constituted social 
dysfunction remained the same, but a 
community chose to react to social 
dysfunction not by excluding the per-
son, or shaming him such that he chose 
to isolate himself, but rather reacted 
with education and warmth, this would 
alleviate the challenges associated with 
autism such that they lower the autis-
tic’s quality of life.  
 Similarly, the second category of 
detrimental autistic characteristics that 
Barnes and McCabe attribute to autis-
tic people, namely “unique sensory 
characteristics,” (Ibid, 267.) fre-
quently lower quality of life only 
insofar as they are not accommodat-
ed. There is nothing inherently debil-
itating about some of these charac-
teristics. For example, imagine there 
is an autistic person who is unable to 
accept a job that he is excited about 
because he is sensitive to the lights 
and sounds of a bright and busy of-
fice, which causes him to display 
autistic tics in order to cope. Rather 
than having his autistic difference 
lower his quality of life, his autistic 
difference could be a catalyst for 
change in the office. Said office has 
a myriad of ways to reasonably ac-
commodate this autistic difference 
without undue hardship, for instance 
replacing light bulbs, posting signs 
about noise level or giving the autis-
tic employee his own space to work. 
It is even possible to accommodate 
this worker by educating his fellow 
workers about their new co-worker’s 
autistic behavior and why it is hap-
pening, allowing the autistic to cope 
in his own way, without physical 
changes to the office or his location 
by ensuring that the autistic employ-
ee and his fellow workers are com-
fortable with his coping mechanisms. 
Overall, while Barnes and McCabe 
provide a list of arguments in favor 
of welcoming a cure, as was their 
intention, they are unable to provide 
a good reason to prefer a cure to ac-
commodation. None of these argu-
ments validate the decision to make 
the search for a cure the central rec-
ommendation for action when cop-
ing with autism.           
 It is my contention that both neu-
rodiverse and cure based approaches 
to autism, and their underlying philo-
sophical positions, can be knitted 
together, to provide a definition of 
autism and recommendations for 
action that engender justice for both 
autistics and their communities.    
 Proponents of the neurodiverse 
perspective have made the compel-
ling case accommodation of autistic 
difference is justified insofar as it 
protects the human dignity of the 
autistic. However, in some ways the 
neurodiversity movement fails to 
acknowledge a limit when autistic 
difference cannot be accommodated, 
and thus fails to provide tools for 
coping with autistic difference when 
accommodation proves impossible or 
ineffective.  
 Proponents of cure theory argue that 
if autistic difference is detrimental, or 
infringes on the capacities of others, 
then it ought to be cured or minimized. 
However they were unsuccessful in 
delimiting when autistic difference was 
harmful and when it was not, resorting 
instead to a definition that painted eve-
ry aspect of autism as problematic and 
to be cured.  
 A synthesis of these two viewpoints 
solves both of their challenges and re-
tains both their benefits. By accepting 
the neurodiverse call for action regard-
ing autism, namely that a just commu-
nity ought to accommodate autistic 
difference, it is possible for cure theory 
to investigate, which aspects of autistic 
difference are actually detrimental and 
in need of curing, and which aspects 
are detrimental only as a result of com-
munity inflexibility. In the case of the 
neurodiverse perspective, by accepting 
that it is possible for accommodation 
and autistic difference to infringe on 
the rights of others, cures and even 
minimizing treatments have a place at 
the periphery of autism action.     
By bringing neurodiverse and cure 
theories of autism together, what is 
created is not a sharply defined view of 
autism, but rather a practical method by 
which to determine how autistic differ-
ence ought to be treated in a just com-
munity. As we discussed above, in or-
der to meet the minimum requirements 
for justice a community is obligated to 
ensure the equality of capabilities that 
would otherwise lead to a deficiency of 
dignity and self-respect. The inequality 
of capabilities, which is caused by not 
accommodating autistic difference, 
results in a deficiency of self-respect; 
therefore justice requires the accommo-
dation of autistic difference. Thus we 
have  the first step of the method for 
action:  
1. Accommodate autistic difference 
through stretching social norms in or-
der to ensure a minimum threshold of 
equality of capabilities, illustrated 
through equal treatment of autistic peo-
ple.   
By the same token, if community 
members are forced to accommodate 
autistic differences that infringe on 
their own capabilities, then it is unjust 
to make those accommodations.   
2. Refuse only those accommoda-
tions that will infringe on the central 
capabilities of the autistic person or 
other community members. Given the 
possibility that autistic difference may 
be expressed in a way that is detri-
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mental to the capacities of the autistic 
person or other community members, 
minimizing treatment, and the search 
for a cure for autism can be justified. 
But only insofar as both of those tactics 
work to minimize or remove the as-
pects of autistic expression or autistic 
difference that infringe on central capa-
bilities. And only insofar as everything 
possible has been done to accommo-
date the autistic differences, short of 
allowing the transgression of central 
capabilities.    
3. Treatments that minimize autis-
tic difference, or try to eradicate it alto-
gether, ought to be used only in the 
case that autistic difference is infring-
ing on the capacities of autistics or their 
communities. 
The cure theory approach to autism 
is built on the foundational assumption 
that disability is an individual problem 
to be solved. Thus, cure theory recom-
mendations for action regarding autism 
depend on replacing autistic difference 
with species typical functioning, via 
minimizing treatments or a cure. The 
neurodiversity movement disrupts the 
narrative that disability is a problem 
that afflicts certain individuals, and 
ought to be righted with cures or treat-
ments. Rather, the goal of neurodiversi-
ty is for “autistic people to have their 
differences recognised as a part of hu-
man diversity, and for society to pro-
vide better adaptations for autistic citi-
zens.” (Owren and Stenhammer 2013, 
33) The neurodiverse view of autism 
presupposes the social model of disa-
bility, which, argues that the challenges 
that come along with disability are rela-
tional. As a result of this understanding 
of disability the recommendations that 
neurodiversity offers are not solutions 
for individuals, but rather a call for 
communities to take steps to accommo-
date autistic difference. A synthesis of 
these two viewpoints results in a flexi-
ble definition of what it is to be disa-
bled. Furthermore, by accepting the 
neurodiverse perspective that a just 
community ought to accommodate au-
tistic difference, it is possible for cure 
theory to investigate what aspects of 
autistic difference are actually in need 
of curing, and which aspects are rela-
tional problems. On the other hand, by 
accepting that it is possible for accom-
modation and autistic difference to 
infringe on the rights of others, cures 
and even minimizing treatments have a 
place in autism action insofar as they 
can control or prevent such detrimental 
behavior. Overall both theories are ca-
pable of informing one another to 
create a comprehensive plan of action 
for the just treatment of autistic peo-
ple.     
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with limited access to a certain type of 
knowing (i.e., an epistemological prob-
lem, as I will argue here).  Of course, 
those with limited epistemic skills in 
certain contexts may be said to be per-
sons of a certain kind since the further 
question then arises as to why those 
individuals have such limited skills.  
However, for the moment I will assert 
that high-functioning autism is a condi-
tion of epistemic insufficiency.  What 
type of insufficiency is this? 
 Long ago, Aristotle (1962) pro-
posed a distinction between episteme, or 
theoretical knowledge, and techne, or 
know-how (i.e., craft).  This distinction 
was revived in modern times by Profes-
sor Ryle (1945) in his discrimination 
between knowing how and knowing 
that.  In high functioning autism (i.e., 
Asperger's), we find deficits in both 
types of knowing.  Indeed, it is these 
deficits which comprise the core of the 
metaphysical distinction between autis-
tics and neurotypicals (as the rest of us 
are called).  It is easy to see these epis-
temic distinctions in the diagnostic for-
mulation of autism spectrum disorder.  
Persons with autism appear not to know 
how to engage in social reciprocity with 
others and do not know how to interpret 
the socio-emotive significance of non-
verbal displays, vocal prosodic shifts 
and patterns, and gestures.  In truth, they 
make very poor social primates and in 
most non-human primate societies 
would not survive long as members of a 
troop.  While they are often quite capa-
ble of speaking articulately, they fre-
quently do not know that certain verbal 
expressions are puns, jokes, metaphors, 
sarcasms, or veiled allusions because 
they usually interpret the linguistic ex-
pressions of others in one way, i.e., liter-
ally.  An example here will suffice: 
[NPK on bike riding;  "No, Dad. Only 
one person can ride a bike at a time. We 
cannot ride my bike."] 
 The question arises as to whether 
all persons who are socially awkward 
and literal-minded are suffering from 
autism.  The answer is unclear.  Usually, 
individuals with autism also experience 
a reasonable amount of social anxiety 
and avoidance of other people, not be-
cause they dislike others but because 
social interaction is often so frustrating 
and difficult for them that they find it  
easier to avoid people than to engage in 
it.  This does not necessarily mean  that 
autistic persons aren't lonely.  Often 
they are.  Yet the emotional cost of en-
gagement with others is such that it is 
less noxious not to interact.   
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 Autism is a condition character-
ized primarily by deficits in social 
perception, social cognition, and so-
cial communication.  These deficits 
can vary in a spectrum-like fashion 
from mild to severe.  Individuals with 
autism can also vary with regard to 
their intellectual and linguistic capa-
bilities.  In the past (prior to DSM-5 
that is), persons with average to supe-
rior intellectual and language skills 
but significant deficits in social ca-
pacities were identified as having 
Asperger's Disorder (DSM-IV, ICD-
9) which was considered a variant of 
autism.  Currently, individuals with 
this pattern of social and cognitive 
functioning are classified as having 
high-functioning autism of which the 
key features are often exceptional 
intellectual capacities but poor social 
awareness and communication skills.  
 The question arises whether the 
problem facing those with autism is 
one of being a certain kind or person 
(i.e., a metaphysical problem as the 
DSM asserts) or of being a person 
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 What accounts for the lack of so-
cial techne exhibited by those with 
autism? A fundamental feature of those 
with high-functioning autism is that 
they either lack a theory of mind en-
tirely or possess a very diminished one 
which prevents them from easily and 
quickly inferring the mental states of 
others in the rapid-fire to-and-fro of 
most social interaction.  To put it dif-
ferently, autistics, even high function-
ing ones, are very slow in the moment 
to grasp the significance of nonverbal 
social behaviors which leaves them at a 
distinct disadvantage to the rest of us 
when trying to opine whether someone 
is joking with them, telling them the 
truth, or shyly trying to engage them.  
A common complaint of autistics is 
that people don't say what they mean 
and don't mean what they say. This is 
the case because virtually all spoken 
verbal content is qualified by nonver-
bal and vocal accompaniments which 
can drastically affect how verbal con-
tent is interpreted. 
 Theories of mind develop early in 
infancy, are usually unarticulated, and 
are a powerful feature of the way in-
fants interact with caregivers.  This sort 
of theory is actually the ultimate know-
ing-how [or techne] and not really a 
theory at all but a group of skills and 
underlying propositions (or knowing-
that) which govern how infants re-
spond to caregivers and other persons 
in their environments. In this sense, a 
theory of mind also comprises what 
Aristotle called episteme, or theoretical 
knowledge, but perhaps a more accu-
rate term would be inferential 
knowledge since it consists of proposi-
tions or rules-of-thumb gleaned from 
interactive experience.  In this way it 
forms a bridge between techne and 
episteme.   
 As a child's theory of mind emerg-
es and evolves through perceptual and 
sensory experience with the physical 
and social worlds of other humans 
(largely through joint action and joint 
attention), it permits the child to infer 
and understand the belief and 
knowledge states of others.  In this 
way, a child is constantly revising what 
s/he thinks and knows about other peo-
ple, specifically and in general, particu-
larly the way other persons approach 
the world including (most importantly) 
the child him- or herself.  This type of 
social knowledge thus emerges from 
the child's distillation of its perceptions 
of the behavior of other agents and its 
interpretations of their behavior into 
discernable actions which can be rec-
ognized when repeated.  Through the 
perception of others' behaviors and 
interpretation of these into aggregates 
understood as actions, children begin 
to discern the intentions and motives 
of others (i.e., their reasons for act-
ing).  In this way children develop 
what might be called socioepistemic 
awareness, i.e., awareness of what 
others know about one another).  It 
should be noted that a child's tenden-
cy to think about the behavior of oth-
er humans as motivated by reasons 
for acting and as intentional (i.e., goal
-directed) seems to be innate in all 
human cultures.  Only among autistic 
children are these tendencies slow to 
develop, if they develop at all.  In my 
view, this is one reason why applied 
behavior therapy works so well with 
these children.  They must be taught 
to think of human behavior (including 
their own) as actions, i.e., as motivat-
ed and intentional.  Accordingly, 
epistemological concepts are funda-
mental to how normal children inter-
pret the world. The degree to which 
these concepts bear some veridical 
relationship to what happens in the 
world (i.e., by allowing the child to 
interpret and predict the actions of 
others) is the degree to which the 
child can make sense of how others 
behave and can form rational narra-
tives about what the social world is 
like (i.e., stories about why others do 
what they do).  In this sense, children 
use Bayesian reasoning to revise hy-
potheses as they grow older about 
what other actors think, intend, and 
are motivated to do.  Accordingly, a 
child's social narratives evolve as her/
his abilities to grasp the underlying 
import and meaning of the actions of 
other agents also evolves.  In this way 
a typical child's hermeneutic capaci-
ties with regard to its own social do-
ings and those of other actors emerg-
es and become more nuanced. 
 How is this different in those 
with high-functioning autism? It ap-
pears that their social perception is 
faulty (i.e., they don't know how to do 
this effectively) and, therefore, their 
interpretations of others' intentions 
and motives is deficient. Moreover, 
the narratives they construct in their 
hermeneutic efforts to parse the social 
behavior of others are accordingly 
faulty (i.e., impaired knowing that 
others are intending, thinking, and 
feeling and knowing how to discern 
what these intentions, thoughts, and feel-
ings are).   
 What, then, is the practical impact of 
these types of socioepistemic deficits for 
those with autism?  That is, what if a per-
son were hermeneutically disadvantaged 
with regard to the capacity to identify and 
interpret the mental states of other 
agents?   
 Miranda Fricker (2007) describes 
what she terms a situated hermeneutical 
inequality which puts one agent in a so-
cial interaction at a clear disadvantage 
with respect to the other parties in that 
interactive context.  The disadvantaged 
actor consequently suffers from a type of 
epistemic injustice which results from a 
hermeneutical gap.  This gap creates an 
asymmetrical cognitive disadvantage 
which, in turn, results in a collective her-
meneutical impoverishment.  It's clear  
that the deficits in theory of mind which 
are a hallmark of higher functioning au-
tistic persons contribute to a form of epis-
temic injustice arising from the limited 
social hermeneutical capacities of those 
persons.  Accordingly, a form of social 
disadvantage arises not only for the autis-
tic individual but for the community as a  
whole.  As Fricker notes, " Consequently, 
a group's unequal hermeneutical partici-
pation will tend to show up in a localized 
manner in hermeneutical hotspots - loca-
tions in social life where the powerful 
have no interest in achieving a proper 
interpretation (Fricker, Kindle locations 
1959-1960)".   
 A fundamental aspect of achieving 
hermeneutical equality in social exchang-
es is the ability possessed by each partici-
pant to judge accurately the epistemic 
trustworthiness of the other participants 
in the exchange.  Fricker points out that 
this is often done through the use of the 
cognitive shorthand of social stereotypes:  
We are picturing hearers as confront-
ed with the immediate task of gaug-
ing how likely it is that what a speak-
er has said is true. Barring a wealth 
of personal knowledge of the speaker 
as an individual, such a judgment of 
credibility must reflect some kind of 
social generalization about the epis-
temic trustworthiness - the compe-
tence and sincerity - of people of the 
speaker's social type, so that it is in-
evitable (and desirable) that the hear-
er should spontaneously avail him-
self of the relevant generalizations in 
the shorthand form of (reliable) stere-
otypes.[Fricker, Kindle Locations 
453-456, Kindle Edition). 
 What would happen if a social partic-
ipant lacked the ability to judge the epis-
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temic worthiness of other interlocu-
tors?  According to Fricker, without the 
use of social heuristic tools, a social 
agent "will not be able to achieve the 
normal spontaneity of credibility judg-
ment that is characteristic of everyday 
testimonial exchange (Fricker, Kindle 
Locations 456-457)."  Yet this is pre-
cisely the position of individuals with 
high-functioning autism. They always 
assume other people are telling them 
the truth.   
 In contrast to autistic individuals, 
neurotypicals [i.e., normal persons] use 
social stereotypes constantly to judge 
the epistemic worthiness of what they 
hear from others in social exchanges.  
As a result, a different type of epistem-
ic injustice can and frequently is perpe-
trated on those who are socially disa-
bled in the ways characteristic of per-
sons with high functioning autism.  
Fricker calls this a case of epistemic 
bad luck since it is not due to prejudice 
as one would normally think of it, but 
from the use of social stereotyping 
which would ordinarily be reliable but 
happens not to be accurate in some 
cases.  High functioning autism is just 
such a case and Fricker gives this ex-
ample: "Imagine that a hearer responsi-
bly judges a speaker to be untrustwor-
thy (because insincere) owing to the 
fact that the speaker avoids looking her 
in the eye, frequently looks askance, 
and pauses self-consciously in mid-
sentence as if to work out his story 
(Fricker, Kindle Locations 573-574)."  
In this thought experiment, one can see 
that an individual with high function-
ing autism, who may also be quite so-
cially anxious, might look untrustwor-
thy to a hearer who has little experi-
ence with this form of disability or 
with that particular individual.  As a 
result, the behavior of the speaker with 
high functioning autism may be misin-
terpreted.  This leads to a form of her-
meneutic injustice which Fricker later 
discusses.  As she notes, "Systematic 
hermeneutical injustices are part of the 
broad pattern of a social group's gen-
eral susceptibility to different sorts of 
injustice (Fricker, Kindle Locations 
2003-2004)".  This type of injustice is 
a hallmark of the inequitable distribu-
tion of power within a society.  In par-
ticular, It is a form of injustice charac-
terized by "having some significant 
area of one's social experience ob-
scured from collective understanding 
owing to hermeneutical marginaliza-
tion (Fricker, Kindle Locations 2032-
2033)".  This is, indeed, the experience 
of many suffering from high func-
tioning autism in Western societies.   
 Fricker goes on to comment that 
"hermeneutical injustice sometimes 
[is] so damaging that it cramps the 
very development of self... (Fricker, 
Kindle Locations 2103-2104)." Thus 
"the primary harm of hermeneutical 
injustice ... is to be understood not 
only in terms of the subject's being 
unfairly disadvantaged by some col-
lective hermeneutical lacuna, but also 
in terms of the very construction 
(constitutive and/or causal) of self-
hood (Fricker, Kindle Locations 2172
-2173)." 
 As clinicians or simply individu-
als concerned about living in a just 
society, what can we do?  The answer 
I would suggest lies less in new types 
of therapy for those with high func-
tioning autism since we already have 
some very effective ones which are a 
combination of cognitive behavioral 
and psychodynamic approaches.  
Rather, I would argue that what is 
necessary to remedy the type of epis-
temic and hermeneutical injustices 
described by Fricker from the social 
exchanges experienced by people 
with high functioning autism every 
day is a change in the way we think 
about what it means to be a commu-
nity of social actors.  I would agree 
with Fricker that an important step to 
be taken in assisting those with high 
functioning autism to be fully partici-
patory members of a society is that 
there must be some form of herme-
neutical justice which becomes com-
monplace in social exchanges.  More-
over, the ways in which those with 
high functioning autism are misinter-
preted and misunderstood must be 
explored not only in their therapies 
but must be exposed and discredited 
in the societies in which they exist.  
This requires a systematic effort on 
the part of professionals and the fami-
lies of those with high functioning 
autism to undermine inaccurate stere-
otypes about autistics in the society at 
large and to replace them with views 
that are more consistent with the 
character of most high functioning 
autistic persons.  When engaging in a 
social exchange with an individual 
with autism, there must be, as Fricker 
notes, "an alertness or sensitivity to 
the possibility that the difficulty one's 
interlocutor is having as she tries to 
render something communicatively 
intelligible is due not to its being non-
sense or her being a fool, but rather to 
some sort of gap in collective herme-
neutical resources (Fricker, Kindle Lo-
cations 2189-2191)."   
 However, while Fricker feels this 
gap is due to an "an objective difficulty 
and not a subjective failing (Kindle 
Location 2191)," my view is that both 
are present with regard to those with 
high functioning autism.  These indi-
viduals are less competent in certain 
socially cognitive ways but are also the 
subjects of hermeneutic injustice which 
further leads to their social impoverish-
ment and isolation as well as to the di-
minishing of the affective richness of 
the societies in which they live.  It is 
only through a communal approach 
designed to provide corrective social 
interactions and the experience of being 
understood by others that such herme-
neutic injustice can be corrected.  This 
type of approach is currently being tried 
in a few locales but it is far from highly 
developed.  Moreover, it must be one 
component of the successful treatment 
of those with high functioning autism 
but not the only one since these individ-
uals are at great risk for a variety of 
other co-morbid conditions such as 
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, 
anxiety disorders (especially social anx-
iety, obsessive compulsive disorder, 
and tics), and depression.   
 In summary, I believe that those 
with high functioning autism can flour-
ish within a community that engages 
them with compassion and sensitivity.  
In such communities, they can be sig-
nificant participants and can, in turn, 
contribute to the flourishing of their 
wider societies.  Alternatively, if those 
with high functioning autism continue 
to be the subject of epistemic and her-
meneutic injustice, these practices can 
only serve to diminish the richness of 
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Is it Ethical to Change  
Memories to Treat Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder 
(PTSD)? 
 





 Articles published in the popular 
press and the social medial during the 
latter part of last year (Romm 2014) 
and before (McGowan 2009) have 
brought back our attention to the con-
troversial issue of changing people’s 
memories- and by extension their feel-
ings, thoughts, and behaviors- by 
health care professionals during clini-
cal interventions. The concern has cen-
tered on changing recollections of trau-
matic memories in persons deemed 
vulnerable by their condition when 
seeking relief from their symptoms and 
placed in the hands of psychiatrists, 
psychologist and other psychothera-
pists. A main focus of their concern has 
been effecting such changes with psy-
chotropic medication but lately the 
criticism has been extended to include 
also those receiving psychotherapeutic 
interventions administered to children, 
hospitalized patients suffering from 
psychosis or otherwise easily suggesti-
ble or vulnerable. At the beginning of 
this year, the controversy escalated 
with the publishing of a short but criti-
cal article to current practices of psy-
chiatric diagnosis and treatment enti-
tled Redefining Mental Illness in the 
New York Times by an academic an-
thropologist T.M. Luhrmann of Stan-
ford University, where she analyzed a 
report published by The British Psy-
chological Society entitled Under-
standing Psychosis and Schizophrenia:  
Why people sometimes hear voices, 
believe things that others find strange, 
or appear out of touch with reality, 
and what can help. These comments 
draw a quick and sharp reply from Jef-
frey Lieberman, the Chairman of Psy-
chiatry of Columbia University College 
of Physicians and Surgeons and past 
president of the American Psychiatric 
Association (APA). Later, Dr. Lieber-
man and Dr. Thomas Insel, current 
director of the National Institute of 
Mental Health (NIMH) issued a con-
joint statement in the hope of clarifying 
the situation. In a prior response to 
these kind of positions, Ronald Pies, 
a psychiatrists and past editor of the 
Psychiatric Times, had lamented the 
“wall of separation” or what I call 
polarization of these controversies. 
Indeed, there appears to be no at-
tempt to reach a “golden mean” in 
these conversations. 
 My interest in the topic was 
sparked by the fact that I work as a 
clinical psychiatrist- providing both 
psychotropic medication as well as 
psychotherapy -in the Lower East 
Side of Manhattan where we were 
traumatized by the tragic events of 
9/11 and where we still try to make 
sense of these events. 
 
 II. Ontology and Epistemology: 
what is it and how do we know it? 
Ontology  
 The question posed is typically 
asked in a way that privileges what is 
ethical: Is it ethical? That is the way 
it is explicitly asked while the rest of 
the question- what is PTSD, what are 
memories, and how to treat them -is 
implicitly assumed to be already well
-grounded?  But, instead, their im-
portance may be the other way 
around and the anchors may be drag-
ging. Allow me then to answer the 
question but in the reverse order in 
which it was proposed: whether they 
exist, what are they, how to treat 
them properly and why would it be 
good to do so, because the existence 
of being determines its method of 
exploration and knowledge (Gilson, 
1990). Its ethical application would 
then follow. This methodology is 
called methodological realism, the 
proposed adequate method to study 
objects of reality and can be applied 
even to the changing meaning of 
concepts studied by hermeneutics. 
To that effect, to paraphrase, under-
standing is never subjective relation 
to a given ‘object’ but to the history 
of its effects; in other words, under-
standing belongs to the being of that 
which is understood (see also Gada-
mer 1996; Giusanni 1997; Hegel 
1812/1969).  
 What, then, is the object of study 
of psychology in general and medical 
psychology otherwise known as psy-
chiatry in specific?  
 
Aristotelian view 
 Aristotle 2500 years ago correct-
ly realized that the mind (the object 
of psychology and psychiatry) 
“cannot be a body [but] the form of a 
natural body (De Anima 412a20).” 
Simply stated: the mind is the dynamic 
actualized form of the human body. 
Since the brain and the nervous tissue 
has the specific function within the 
body to integrate body physiology it 
would be reasonable-albeit controver-
sial-to assume the substantial unity of 
the form of the whole body-the mind-
and the material tissue that integrates 
the plenitude of functions of the whole 




 The current debate is ontological-
ly polarized between those who make 
exclusive emphasis on the body (soma 
or res extensa) and on the other hand 
those who exclusively emphasize the 
mind (psyche or res cogitant) while 
everything else is derivative. The Na-
tional Institute of Health (NIH) and 
the (NIHMH) seem to have sided with 
the body as “res extensa” and as such 
had been working on proposals to find 
solutions to these problems from that 
perspective.  
 Dr. Thomas Insel, current director 
of the NIMH had issued in his NIMH 
blog dated August 13, 2013 a state-
ment on the nature of Traumatic Brain 
Injury (TBI) and PTSD. “We recog-
nize TBI and PTSD as brain injuries…
[in contrast to most other neuropsychi-
atric disorders]... but the brain tissue 
we need to study to understand them is 
in short supply.” I would agree that 
those conditions are wounds and con-
sequently the result of an experience 
but I would argue that this attempt to 
solve the problem only restates and 
updates the modern dualism that caus-
es the current polarization in our de-
bates. Dr. Insel, elsewhere, in disbelief 
of other psychiatrist’s position who 
asserts that mental illnesses are real 
said instead that “there is no reality” in 
them. And adds that “they are just 
constructs.” (Greenberg, p.340). In my 
opinion, these comments unnecessari-
ly polarize the concepts of ‘real’ and 
“constructs,” and imply that ontology 
has nothing to do with epistemology. 
But, practicing psychiatrist, like me, 
live that reality whenever we are in 
contact and diagnose our patients. 
Most clinical psychiatrists and other 
mental health workers are well aware 
of our epistemological limitations in 
knowing and discerning (diagnosing) 
the truth about that reality, but not 
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tentially integrate disparities in the ar-
guments. But as things stand now, al-
ready neurologists and psychopharma-
cologists center their concern on the 
study of nervous tissue primarily while 
psychologists and psychotherapists in 
general center their interests on the 
mind,  and the general psychiatrists’ 
practice along with “brain-minded” 
therapists trying to bridge both ap-
proaches are caught in a “no fly zone.” 
 In summary, ongoing dualism 
characterizes the current divergent 
opinions about the nature of diagnosing 
and its outcome. The examples above 
epitomize the recent controversy, which 
polarize the systemic differentiation 
between body and mind. Dualistic 
tendencies can be identified, within the 
current discussions, by their ideological 
opposition between these two catego-
ries. Dualism characterize them as dif-
ferent substances rather than different 
forms of one substance, of the one body 
which had been the standard conceptu-
alization in western science until the 
1600’s. In short, modern science does 
not have an adequate philosophical 
framework—an ontology — to define 
correctly whether it is [ens] and then 
describe what it is [quid].  It begins 
restricting a priori the scope of the defi-
nition as a material substance—the 
brain — only to find it a posteriori. But, 
methodologically and somewhat incon-
sistently, it casts a larger net by allow-
ing a broader scope of possible contri-
butions to its definitions. In contrast, 
critics of modern science espousing the 
indefinite case-by-case formulation 
undermine the very foundations of the 
patterns and principles defined by natu-
ral science. To use D.J. Siegel’s meta-
phor: science is caught “between chaos 
and rigidity:” That is, between the rela-
tive rigidity of the official science and 
the amorphous dynamism of opinions.   
 
III. Epistemology and Mathematics 
 
 The mind as the ‘form of the body’ 
following the Aristotelian dictum 
should put us in good footing regarding 
how we go about conceptualizing those 
mental forms that are the object of our 
study, that is, defining the method of 
knowing. And, preeminently, “the soul 
[mind] is known by its acts.” (Aquinas 
ST I Q87, A1,2, 3; I,Q16). 
 In specific, the study of integrative 
nature of this form not only includes the 
nervous tissue structure but the endo-
crine system and the stress Hypotha-
knowing that reality in its totality does 
not take away that it is based and at-
tempts to reach a deeper understanding 
of reality. “All that exits exists as 
form.” (Pieper). Mental illnesses are 
specific forms in which the mind-the 
form of the body- exist at particular 
times and places. These mental forms 
are not substances or things per se of 
any kind in particular, except of that 
only one thing that it is (“to on” in 
ancient Greek, realis in Latin). They 
are, indeed, manifestations of what it is 
as images, impressions or fantasies, 
that is, new forms of reality that can be 
relatively differentiated from each oth-
er and is the object of study by Sys-
tems Theory. Their substantial novelty 
attracts the attention and exploration of 
our inquisitive minds. During this pro-
cess of exploration we construct tem-
porary notions that summarize our 
knowledge at the time. The generator 
of this constructive process of 
knowledge is the encounter between 
the patient and the clinician. H. S. Sul-
livan had proposed a long time ago the 
stance of participant observer as cen-
tral to the therapeutic relationship. In 
specific, the attuned activity between 
these two agents (and even more dur-
ing a family meeting), allow for a con-
structive process of knowledge to oc-
cur. But, this knowledge is not merely 
cognitive but includes all the existing 
organizers of the experience in the 
body acting in conjunction in order to 
attune and change, along with the syn-
chronous knowledge that includes the 
double perspective of the participant 
observer: an a priori professional 
knowledge about past knowledge like 
scientific research and past personal 
experiences of the clinician as well as 
those of the patient along with the ac-
cumulating knowledge of the present 
moment that is the source for a posteri-
ori reflection. The codification of that 
professional knowledge is the realm of 
scientific research. Whilst in the clini-
cal encounter, like in any interpersonal 
meeting, the professional and the pa-
tient use their prior information along 
with the present moment and transform 
it. T. De Chardin has aptly commented 
on its ontogenetic importance. “The 
being who is the object of his own re-
flection, in consequence of very dou-
bling back upon himself becomes in a 
flash able to raise himself into a new 
sphere. In reality, another world is 
born…it is not a matter of change of 
degree, but a change in nature, result-
ing from a change of state.”  
 The current debate is polarized 
between those who make exclusive 
emphasis on the body (soma or res 
extensa) and on the other hand those 
who exclusively emphasize the mind 
(psyche or res cogitans). I advocate 
not only for a synthesis of cognition 
but for the synergy (following 
Blondel) of all the aspects of the 
body; a synergy that encompasses the 
natural flow of energy of the encoun-
ter in the present moment, as it mani-
fests itself. It is the moral imperative 
in psychiatry and the mental health 
field not just of thinking together or 
talking together but even more of 
working together. The process of 
diagnosing, likewise, cannot just be a 
meeting of two cognitive powers ex-
changing data during anamnesis. And 
not just of deliberating by the profes-
sional. But, instead, two fully human 
beings getting to know each other, 
even as unequal as that exchange 
could necessarily be.  That is also the 
reason why psychiatrists must be 
psychotherapists and physicians at 
large must be at least exposed to that 
field.  
 The “metaphysical wager” (Scull 
2015) of modernism- that the body 
could be exclusively studied by ex-
perimentation and not by experience 
did not paid off.   It goes without 
saying that experimentation has been 
extremely fruitful especially in inor-
ganic sciences. But at this stage of 
scientific development excluding the 
experiential methods of clinicians is 
actually stalling the further develop-
ment of mental health. Scull asks, 
“Will ‘madness’…be reducible at 
last…to biology?” Hopefully, we will 
think out of the box and consider the 
contributions of psychology, sociolo-
gy, anthropology and philosophy on 
the bottom-up side and of chemistry, 
physics and others on the top-down 
side of scientific inquiry. From the 
general to the specific and from the 
specific to the general has been a 
noble quest in the philosophy of sci-
ences in contrast with the disjointed 
method of one dominated by mathe-
matics.  
 If Dr. Insel had said that TBI and 
PTSD are both clinical syndromes 
that are injuries to the body as a 
whole and that the injury is centered 
or concentrated in the central nervous 
system, in my opinion, he would have 
proposed a solution that could start 
bringing together both poles and po-
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lamic Pituitary Adrenal Axis (HPA), as 
well as its physiology: the cardiac 
rhythm and vascular baroreceptors reg-
ulating the arterial blood pressure. In 
fact, many of the research domains 
criteria (RDoC) proposed by NIMH to 
start solving the problem of defining 
the object of study are already in pe-
ripheral or somatic physiology like 
Heart Rate Variability HRV), and other 
psychophysiological measurements 
without explicitly recognizing the 
broad spectrum of physiological varia-
bles that minding controls. The RDoC 
constructs are well grounded in the 
body. Of the eight unit of analysis 
(genes, molecules, cells, circuits, phys-
iology, behavior, self-reports, para-
digms) six are related to the individu-
al’s body. Self-reports are subjective 
appraisals by the person and paradigms 
are established methods of exploration 
of those systematized objects of study.  
But, only few of those methods address 
the measurement of qualities related to 
interpersonal relations. For example, 
only under the negative valence system 
of the so-called frustrative non-reward 
and all the self-reports and paradigms 
of the sub-construct of attachment for-
mation and maintenance have to do 
with interpersonal relationship meas-
urements among the hundreds of possi-
ble areas of study. In family therapy, 
we are keenly mindful of the ontoge-
netic potential of interpersonal rela-
tions. For example, in the context of a 
therapeutic stance with an enmeshed 
family Minuchin (1974) has said that: 
“the sense of belonging dominates the 
experience of being, at the expense of a 
sense of a separate self.” As such, acts 
of being are defined by experiences of 
belonging to one’s own self and others: 
to be is to belong.  
 And, finally, as the NIMH reports 
concludes: “the current diagnostic sys-
tem is not informed by recent break-
throughs…as it turns out, most genetic 
findings and neural circuits maps ap-
pear either to link to many different 
currently recognized syndromes or to 
distinct subgroups within syndromes. If 
we assume that the clinical syndromes 
based on subjective symptoms are 
unique and unitary disorders, we un-
dercut the power of biology to identify 
illnesses linked to pathophysiology and 
we limit the development of more spe-
cific treatments.”  
 Thereby, the stated focus on the 
brain by Dr. Insel is conceptually in-
consistent with the actual, broader and  
potentially richer selection of RDoC.  
Without an adequate initial philo-
sophical conceptualization of the 
entire process, would they be able to 
abstract the broad richness of the 
results of the incoming research? I 
believe that they would be limited. 
The RDoC start from the particular 
and attempt to generalize. Others, 
like Karl Menninger and more re-
cently the editor of Current Psychia-
try- H.A. Nasrallah -have suggested 
the opposite, that there is “only one 
neurobiological psychiatric disorder 
with different clinical expressions 
(Nasrallah, 2015).” It is based on an 
attempt to find “a common neurobio-
logical substrate for mental illness 
(Goodkin, et al 2015)” or difference 
“in degree rather than in 
kind” (Greenberg).   While it is truth-
ful and helpful to generalize there is 
also a peril in overgeneralization. It 
helps to direct and concentrate our 
efforts into the exploration of the 
nervous system in general, but there 
are also specific circuits with specific 
genetic interactions with specific 
types of experiences that merit de-
limitation and special methods in 
their research. Overall, these contro-
versies epitomize the current ideo-
logical debate on the topic of diagno-
sis and treatment in psychiatry. They 
seem overall to pit biology and diag-
nosis on one side of the debate 
against personal experiences and 
social interaction, on the other side of 
the debate. The way I see it is that 
what appears to be an ethical,  patho-
logical, and diagnosis issue is pri-
marily an ontological and methodo-
logical one. The RDoC project in 
NIMH shows tangible efforts in that 
direction but the way they conceptu-
alize it, the way they think about it, is 
more inconsistent than what they 
themselves realize. A central mistake 
in conceptualizing psychiatric disor-
ders is the widespread disregard by 
the natural sciences for the potential 
contributions that the most general of 
sciences- philosophy -can and should 
make in these debates.  And philoso-
phy can contribute more to that anal-
ysis: it can contribute synthesis and 
synergy. The severe antithesis— 
modernism and post-modernism —
that we live could possibly be solved 
by the Blondelian restoration of 
agency- synergism -through the phi-
losophy of action. Or what Janet 
(1935) calls realization: “The end 
result of therapy leads to a higher level 
of integrative capacity: “realiza-
tion.” (Ogden 2006). 
 
IV. On Method: Mathematics and 
Statistics 
 
 But in order to resolve the prob-
lem of dualism one must tackle the 
practical reason of how this polariza-
tion is maintained. I would say that it is 
due to the digitalization of natural sci-
ences by mathematics in the form of 
algebra- measurement has become 
synonymous with quantification- and 
especially in research with disregard of 
the analogy of rhythmic forms.  
 Is this situation unique to our ob-
ject of study-the mind -or should we 
use the very same methods used for 
other objects of science. For instance, 
should psychology use the same meth-
ods used to study the biology of the 
human body? The source of qualifica-
tion-the sensorial analyzers within the 
eye, ear, etc.- of the body are part of 
our object of study as well as the sub-
ject who studies. This presents the pe-
culiar difficulty in that the objectifica-
tion of measurement with quantities 
can in turn help us overcome within 
the above framework, and then we can 
still proceed to study it. That is, the 
object is the subject, but only generally 
speaking. The same object can hardly 
be the same subject except in reflection 
when possibly a part- the prefrontal 
cortex -has evolved to take certain 
functions of reflection for the whole. 
De Chardin along with Minuchin’s 
quote draws our attention to the fact 
that a person cannot just be seen as an 
“individual.” More than numerical, 
human beings relate and belong, reflect 
about themselves and contemplate the 
world.  As such in the field of psycho-
logical sciences, in general, we can 
measure but we can hardly qualify and 
quantify the way it is done in other 
sciences. In fact, to measure is to place 
a thing (quid) in relationship to some-
thing else (aliquid). But this fundamen-
tal notion is generally disregarded in 
the physical sciences opting for rigidly 
bound conceptualizations seemingly at 
times to be the sole product of Pythag-
orean thinking without consciously 
recognizing its epistemological link 
with an incommensurable reality.  
 In psychiatry, part of medicine and 
part of the general field of psychology, 
we continue to use the Diagnostic Sta-
tistical Manual (DSM) as the method 
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to base our clinical research rather than 
the other way around. The diagnosis is 
taken to be the “independent variable” 
or the standard by which we measure 
therapeutic outcomes rather than the 
outcome of our investigations. Thus, 
PTSD is an “under-construction” con-
cept that is only temporarily necessary 
as it is presently designed. But, every 
time there is a revision of the diagnos-
tic criteria for PTSD the previous re-
search on PTSD becomes somewhat 
obsolete. And worse, it is a research 
strategy biased on a circular logic: re-
ducing uncritically ‘what it is’ to ‘what 
we think it is’ corrupts the path for fur-
ther exploration and the eventual re-
construction of the term closer to what 
it in fact is its true nature. 
 Medical research designs are 
mathematically constructed with the 
Bell Curve in mind among other math-
ematical procedures. It is a procedure 
to study populations. Nevertheless, it 
has been used unwisely to determine 
the medication dosage, for example, for 
a specific individual. Medical practice 
began to switch from the experience of 
an art during the Medieval Ages (that 
was very underdeveloped by modern 
standards) to one increasingly dominat-
ed by the experiment that by now is a 
highly technical enterprise.   
 If our science is not Pythagorean 
and we prize the material bases of our 
objects of study, methodologically 
speaking, measuring quantities without 
specifying a natural quality as such is a 
highly questionable scientific proce-
dure. This process possibly started un-
wittingly during the XVII century with 
a great idea, one spearheaded by Des-
cartes, Leibnitz and Newton’s attempt 
to develop science by making it mathe-
matical. Going too far by keeping the 
quantity and eliminating the quality 
leaves us with only numbers and 
thoughts. “Whole” numbers by defini-
tion are integers and disconnected or 
sharply distinguished from each other. 
Mathematics, and more precisely Sta-
tistics, rather than experience and dis-
cernment, became the proof of exist-
ence! 
 Furthermore, ‘what we think it is’ 
is constructed from mathematical 
measurements based on statistical 
quantification. Statistical theory has 
become the final arbiter to determine 
what is adequate evidence, thereby 
evidence-based. But mathematical 
terms, by definition, are discrete, that 
is, rigidly bounded. For example we 
have integers: 1, 2, etc. In contrast, the 
material energy flow of the universe 
is a formal rhythm that can be quali-
fied or conceptually digitalized but 
there is more than that to its exist-
ence. The dialectic movement be-
tween quantity and quality is com-
plex. Suffice to say that, the numeri-
cal range of a qualification is con-
strained by the specific form of the 
existence of its object. The eye is 
impacted by the whole but only the 
light is effectively impressed, under 
normal circumstances, to produce a 
visual sensation, a visual perception 
and then a visual memory.  
 Qualities are natural formations. 
The anatomy and physiology of sight 
determines in advance the specific 
kind of impression that can potential-
ly be caused in the periphery of the 
optic nerve by the event. But the con-
tingent outcome is due to other casual 
intervening events. Therefore, every 
event is unique. These sensual partic-
ularities are then processed: reunited 
or re-integrated and even reorganized 
along the multiplicity neural paths. 
Repeated activations along the dy-
namic tracing of neurons are exam-
ples that sometimes epitomize the 
preferred course from sensation to 
memory. But preference is not neces-
sity. And, overreliance on statistical 
quantification without the broader 
understanding action of the research-
er and clinicians severely limit the 
ability to not only further the under-
standing of the nature of the problem 
but even more so it limits the range of 
action of clinical interventions. In 
other words, general scientific guide-
lines in the use of medications dosage 
are based on population statistics and 
not on the individual’s genetic, bio-
logic or even psychological makeup.    
 Thirdly, The problem is not so 
much the diagnosis: it is the diagnos-
ing by the “diagnoser.” The very ac-
tion of the psychiatrist at the very 
moment of diagnosing, the activity it- 
self of the diagnosing is what is at 
stake. Gadamer, speaking about the 
nature of science in general, express-
es his dissatisfaction with the lack of 
differentiation between the physical 
sciences and the applied human sci-
ences. He says:  “Our science is not 
based on the experience of life but on 
that of making and producing [of 
tangible goods, not on the experience 
of equilibrium [restoration of natural 
rhythms] but on that of projective 
[artificial] construction. The science 
is essentially …a kind of mechan-
ics…the artificial production of effects, 
which would not come about simply by 
themselves…that it finally becomes 
capable of replacing the natural by the 
artificial.” In contrast, “Among all the 
sciences concerned with nature the 
science of medicine is the one which 
can never be understood entirely as a 
technology, precisely because it invari-
ably experiences its own abilities and 
skills simply as a restoration of what 
belongs to nature. And that is why 
medicine represents a peculiar unity of 
theoretical knowledge and practical 
know-how…” (p.38-39).  
 In summary, the starting point of 
modern-rather than medieval- medical 
practice is that it defines normality but 
not healt, having given up on its aims 
or goals-the telos-which is restoration 
of health. The chasm between mathe-
matically driven research and clinical 
and politically driven diagnostic manu-
als have become altogether obvious to 
the inpatient population in need of ser-
vices.  
 How is this ontological and episte-
mological confusion relevant to the 
ethical dilemma of diagnosing and 
treatments of PTSD? In specific: What 
is PTSD, conceptually speaking, in the 
DSM, how do these traumatic memory 
transformations happen naturally and 
therapeutically and finally why would 
it be igood and even more healthy to do 
so?  
 The so-called PTSD could be bet-
ter characterized psychophysiological-
ly: psychologically by the existence of 
traumatic, explicit or implicit, recollec-
tions of memory with a concurrent 
physiology characterized by a somatic 
distress syndrome that follows an ex-
ternal event that is determined a poste-
riori to be the putative agent. What is 
trauma? Literally it means a wound. 
But in the reality of the body, it is be-
ing traumatized now rather than just 
having been traumatized at a specific 
time in the past, that is, a present day 
activity rather something that just hap-
pened in the past and was determined 
chronologically. It includes the distor-
tion of body timing. The concept of 
“post-trauma” within the PTSD name 
is vitiated by the ambiguous construc-
tion of that term. If the “trauma” is just 
the initial traumatic experience and 
everything else- including the current 
symptoms-is after or post-trauma, one 
could easily misunderstand trauma 
chronologically: that “what happened 
already happened” and “it is no longer 
happening.” Nothing is farther from the 
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truth than this chronological conceptu-
alization based on an external se-
quence of events. And, therefore, also 
misunderstood in terms of volition 
leading some to say “Get over it!” 
Within this framework of misunder-
standing of the concept of “post-
trauma” one would logically deduce 
therapeutic interventions based solely 
on imaginal (virtual) or real re-
exposure to an adverse event and one 
circumscribed to either the initial trau-
matic event or one similar to it, until 
the posterior and persistent classical or 
operant conditioned emotional part of 
the mind mind-the limbic system- is 
helped to realize with the help of the 
once off-line prefrontal cortex that “it 
happened but it is not happening now.” 
An intervention would be based solely 
on de-conditioning or desensitization 
of cognition and emotion. But, in fact, 
the experience of trauma is more than 
the initial traumatic event and more 
than the explicit cognition and emotion 
of the event.  
 Certainly, PTSD is a stress disor-
der, physiologically speaking. The 
physiology of stress and traumatic 
distress is well documented in the sci-
entific literature (see Goldberg, Kabat-
Zinn, Lehrer). And, it is a dis-order- a 
natural healthy biological process go-
ing astray- rather than just a disease in 
the pathophysiological sense of the 
word, because there is no defined path-
ogen in the traditional sense of the 
word (like for instance a specific bac-
teria). PTSD does not fit modern mod-
el of disease. It can be conceptualized 
both in degree of physiological dis-
turbance (as Menninger did) or as an 
anatomical “scar” (as James did).  
 One could ask: Is the trauma the 
“external” event, i.e., an earthquake, or 
is it an internal impression on the body
-like a visual image, distressing emo-
tion or a disturbing body sensation 
caused by such external event?  Do we 
need an external event?  Or can we 
conceive of it as solely internally gen-
erated? The answer is that we always 
need an external event to cause an 
internally regenerated disruption. But, 
internal and external are relative terms. 
For example, lack of oxygen on the 
myocardial cells may lead to chest 
discomfort and then emotional dis-
tress. In this case the heart muscle 
cells are external to the nerve dendrites 
and they belong to different systems of 
the body that are external to each oth-
er.  
 From a unitary perspective like  
 
hylomorphism-dynamic matter-, an 
explosion of a grenade in the middle 
of nowhere would be just an event. 
But, it could be easily become an 
adverse event to a body in proximity 
or even at a physical or chronological 
distance. These are the cases of vicar-
ious and developmental trauma. But, 
again, it need not be necessarily so. 
For example, securely attached adult 
and children may overcome traumat-
ic disorganization spontaneously 
more readily than those with insecure 
attachments. If the body is wounded 
the following question emerges: did 
the impact wound the body in its 
totality of parts or forms or only did 
it hurt some of them? Those particu-
lar wounds then, a posteriori- after 
the event-, would be called traumatic 
events that could possibly lead to 
traumatic distress. A priori, there is 
no one-to-one correspondence be-
tween the event and the necessity of a 
wound. Nevertheless, once the 
wound is inflicted to the body, that is, 
a posteriori, the event can be called 
an adverse event and the wound can 
be called “post-traumatic.” That is, 
only with the initiation and persis-
tence of symptoms indicating the 
temporal and somatic persistence of 
the initial wounding event one could 
in a restricted temporal sense call for 
an initial traumatic event followed by 
a persistent “post-traumatic series of 
events” in the body.  
 Nevertheless, the term “post-
traumatic” is incorrectly used to refer 
to the impact or to the external event. 
The DSM 5 A1 (p. 271) criteria to 
decide if to diagnose PTSD, is stated 
as “directly experiencing the traumat-
ic event.” Here the meaning of the 
term “exposure” and “traumatic 
event” are blurred. In other words, in 
trying to determine if trauma exists 
or not, one must assume that trauma 
already exists. This is a Kantian tau-
tology. It would be clearer to say 
“directly (but also witnessing, learn-
ing, or be vicariously or persistently) 
exposed to a potentially traumatic 
event.” In spite of being a good 
guess, jumping into conclusion at this 
early stage of the exploration is a 
premature determination.  The ade-
quate action would be to withhold 
judgment into deciding what it is (to 
on) until the phenomena unfolds in 
the fullness of its dimension if possi-
ble. Tracking the natural history of 
the body’s symptoms is a wise activi-
ty to help link the effects of the adversi-
ty on the body. For this the additional 
criteria (B-H) related to the internal 
effects as dependent variables on crite-
ria A provide a necessary linkage to 
core organizers of this experience.  
 While without a doubt, the adverse 
external event and the wound are inex-
tricably related as a sequence of events, 
the common use of the term “post-
traumatic” implies inevitability, a fixed 
determinism between an external and 
an internal sequence of events. In fact, 
in the sequence there are degrees of 
freedom, or contingency. 
 In summary, an experience like 
trauma is contingent upon several con-
joint processes and it is not unequivo-
cally or solely determined by the adver-
sity of the external event. Experiences 
are undetermined a priori and only de-
termined a posteriori. The action of the 
will as well as prior learning, for exam-
ple, sometimes plays a key role in its 
definition.  
 Overall, it is difficult to explore a 
natural condition that has been inade-
quately conceptualized. PTSD is best 
thought as a work in progress. For ex-
ample, the proposed diagnosis of De-
velopmental Trauma encompasses 
symptoms that do not qualify for 
PTSD. Nevertheless, it may include 
more severe and chronic pathology than 
PTSD. Unfortunately, it is the obligato-
ry standard of measurement used by 
researchers and clinicians to quantify 
progress in therapy and (tautologically) 
delimit the very same concept it is try-
ing to define.  
 The core of the trauma is not in the 
genes but rather it is the traumatic ex-
perience, that is, the persistence of 
memory in the form of recollections 
that activate or deactivate the body into 
unhealthy dynamics. Being initially in 
“the faculty of sense-perception” it 
spreads into association areas of the 
brain and the rest of the body. Top-
down and bottom-up flows of energy 
disrupt the synergy of the body rhythms 
and disjoint them into increasingly dys-
tonic bouts of fragmentation and dys-
synchronicity. These eventually lead to 
additional memories of all kinds 
(implicit, somatic, emotional, sensorial, 
propioceptive, interoceptive, etc.) that 
dissociate from healthy integrated 
rhythms and could lead to additional 
dis-ease and general unhealthy somatic 
or mental states. These dis-eased 
rhythms become conditioned and liable 
to be triggered at a later occasion or 
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 activated autonomously without the 
company of the explicit memory of the 
initial trauma.  These dysrhythmic dis-
ruptions can be easily measured objec-
tively by psychophysiological measure-
ments. Among these, Heart Rate Varia-
bility and electroencephalography have 
become increasingly popular among 
clinicians.  
 Event and experiences are inti-
mately related but wounds [trauma] are 
overwhelming experiences that the 
body [soma] suffers [pathos] and de-
forms [morphe] it from achieving its 
end [telos] which is health [holos] even 
if sometimes we learn from it 
[emperias].   
 After all, the so-called PTSD along 
with the other trauma spectrum disor-
ders is a disturbance of traumatic recol-
lection of memories again not of the 
initial impact or initial wound but of 
the persistence and re-elaboration (also 
called reinstatement already by Aristo-
tle) of the traumatic stress. The natural-
ly occurring recollected memory is part 
of a sequence of events starting with 
sensation and ending with the consoli-
dated memory as the outcome.  
 
IV.a An example of integrated re-
search in action 
 
 An interesting occurrence was 
recently reported in a recent blog that 
exemplify the integrative relationship 
between clinical acumen and experi-
mental research. Dr. Murray A. 
Raskind described the pendular move-
ment between the information he ob-
tained from his clinical observation 
using the FDA approved but weak hy-
pertensive drug prazosin for PTSD 
nighttime terror and the further experi-
mentation that it suggested to delineate 
the specific population it could help. 
Initially some PTSD soldiers with hy-
pertension and using beta blockers had 
more vivid dreams as noted by the 
manufacturer. Knowing that beta and 
alpha blockers (also used for hyperten-
sion) had sometimes opposite “side 
effects,” he started using the alpha 1 
blocker prazosin for nighttime terror. 
This clinical experience led to the ex-
periment that proved that prazosin is 
indeed a good treatment for it. In con-
trast with the closed circular logic typi-
cally used in modern science, his open 
circular, or better spiraling, logic 
solved the problems. It went from ob-
servation to initial conceptualization to 
personal clinical intervention experi-
ence, to a re-conceptualization based 
on known abstract scientific concept 
without research, to an experience, to 
a re-conceptualization, new interven-
tion and clarification of the popula-
tion, and so on and so forth. This 
process suggested that the antihyper-
tensive turned hypnotic as not only 
treating the episodic labile hyperten-
sion (as approved by the FDA) but 
also the traumatic related nighttime 
terror ( as a “side effect”) maybe due 
to a tonic arousal resetting that may 
be proposed to be the common de-
nominator to both symptoms of hy-
pertension and nighttime terror.  
 A slow, ponderous way out is 
recurring only to mathematical and 
mechanical methods by studying 
proximal causes. For example, a re-
cent article (Tsai et al 2015) chal-
lenging the fitness of the 3, 4 and 5-
factors models based on the confirm-
atory factor analysis (CFA) showed a 
better fit with the 6-factor analysis 
which would include not only the re-
experiencing, avoidance, emotional 
numbing, externalizing behavior, 
anxious arousal but the sixth, the 
dysphoric arousal as well. The rea-
soning behind this proposal are all 
subjective: self-reports by the partici-
pants, only chosen from the military 
and mathematically analyzed by the 
CFA. More objective data like clini-
cal observation of signs as well as 
psychophysiological measurements 
were not included. Also, other types 
of populations like the developmen-
tally traumatized civilian population 
were not included. Gadamer (1996) 
insists in the importance of the par-
ticular (art) within the general 
(science) endeavors: “once science 
has provided doctors with the general 
laws, causal mechanisms, and princi-
ples, they must still discover, what is 
the right thing to do in each particu-
lar case, and this is something which 
hardly seems to be predictable or 
knowable in advance.”  
 
V. Memory and PTSD:  
Memory as mental forms & trau-
matic memories as stress, wounds 
and scars   
 
 What is memory? The word 
memory comes from Mnemosyne, 
the name of the Greek goddess of 
memory who was the mother of the 
Muses, matrons of the arts: literature, 
music, theater, etc. Long before the 
establishment of written language, the 
words had to be kept in mind or be 
memorized. Homer, the blind Greek 
poet had to keep in mind the lengthy 
poems of the Iliad and the Odyssey. 
Memory, expressing itself in recalls 
couched in language is, in a very im-
portant way, self-reports of the present 
state of the body’s experiencing and 
not mere expressions of the past. Any 
performing actor as well as the audi-
ence could attest to it. Thereby, any 
philosophy, wisdom or scientific en-
deavor must take into account the wis-
dom of the body-its immediacy and its 
dynamics- and not just take into con-
sideration cognition and the abstrac-
tions that language expresses.  
 Aristotle’s classical synthesis of 
natural philosophy was preserved and 
transmitted to us through books. From 
sensation to perception to memory, 
thereafter becoming recollections and 
associations or linkages between dif-
ferent memories that appear to be of 
the similar kind and then finally, the 
hylomorphic definition of the mind as 
‘the form of the body,’ this philosophi-
cal understanding of biology was heav-
ily dependent on the construction and 
meaning of words. Blondel criticizes 
the heavy dependence of philosophy 
on the limitations of concepts and 
mathematics. Instead, he proposes a 
philosophy of action centered in life’s 
dynamism where he finds the apeiron 
or the Aristotelian undefined or unde-
termined as the missing and yet the 
lynchpin between the determinism of 
science and the contingency of life. 
The central concept of his philosophy 
of action is synergy. Such inclusive 
and integrative philosophical perspec-
tive can embrace the psychology of 
action proposed by Pierre Janet. This 
psychology of action is centered on the 
concept of fixed action patterns during 
the consolidation of the memory of the 
experience. What’s important here is 
that the memory is not only the usual 
visual image that we usually take to 
mean memory: Not even the explicit 
semantic or autobiographical episodic 
memories! Moreover, memory in-
volves all the core components of the 
experience that include the visual but 
also auditory “images” along with the 
other senses like taste, smell, touch, 
but also and somewhat unexpectedly to 
the mind accustomed to think of 
memory as either explicit or sensorial, 
it also include implicit memories like 
skills, habits, and conditioned respons-
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es of all kinds learned during our de-
velopment. Even genes could be con-
ceived as the ultimately evolutionary 
implicit memory. These are the contri-
butions from current neuroscience.  
 
VI: Neurodynamics of memory 
 
 Adding to the classical definition 
of memory the Tulvig distinction be-
tween explicit and implicit memories 
enriches our understanding of this trau-
matic pathophysiology.   
 Later, E. Kandel, finding the neu-
ral processes and catalogue of the dif-
ferent types of known memories, an-
chors again the psychology of trauma 
back to the body.  
 Siegel’s outstanding integration of 
our understanding of memory within 
the development of the person and 
within society reaffirms not only the 
determining importance of the imprint-
ing of family relations through the de-
velopment of attachment but the ongo-
ing importance of a clear understand-
ing of experience in the causation of 
the disorganization of the mind. He has 
pointed out some popular misconcep-
tions about the notion of memory. To 
paraphrase, it is usual for the general 
public to believe that we are conscious 
of the fullness of our experience, that 
those experiences are stored in our 
minds as a sort of videotape, and what 
we learned in the past is clearly labeled 
as memory. In contrast, neuroscience 
has clearly shown otherwise: explicit 
memories are the mere tip of the ice-
berg, most of our memories are implic-
it memories of which we are unaware 
as we experience them, and all those 
recollections are conflations or at times 
even distortions of the actual experi-
ences.  According to Siegel, “memory 
is the way the past events affect future 
functions” (Siegel, p.46). Or rather, 
how the body’s impressions of those 
events in the form of a mind affect 
how we integrate those inputs when 
activated and then we take action. 
 More recently, the field of 
memory research has emphasized the 
importance of reconsolidation of mem-
ories in contrast with the short-term 
working memory and the long-term 
consolidation of memory. These re-
searchers highlight the importance of 
activating all the components of the 
experience, especially those subcon-
scious elements that are mostly somat-
ic in nature and that while remaining 
hidden interrupt the natural process 
of healing.  
 Thereby, in general, trauma is an 
injury to the body. All traumas dis-
rupt healthy processes of the body. In 
other words, the anatomy and the 
physiology of the whole body and not 
just of the brain or even the nervous 
system is potentially injured in trau-
matic stress disorders. From the dis-
ruptive impressions of reality into the 
body’ sensorium, through the disrupt-
ed limbic system and on to the dis-
rupted engrams of codified memory, 
traumatic distress wrecks havoc in 
the healthy processes of the body top-
down to bottom up.  
 Autonoesis or in Tulvig’s terms 
“mental time travel,” which is the 
sense of having a recollection of the 
self throughout time, may well be the 
neurophysiological bases for the con-
cepts of “true” and false” as these 
recollections are the self that provides 
us with the sense of accuracy out of 
our life experiences.  The process of 
reactivation of explicit memories 
regarding the self can be associated 
with a sense of being involved, that is 
called an “ecphoric sensation” which 
my or not be accurate. R. Bjork has 
called the process of retrieval the 
“memory modifier.” 
 Siegel talks about the impact that 
the amygdala activation under the 
influence of stress has on the con-
struction of the memory engrams. 
“Trauma may have a differential im-
pact on explicit as well as implicit 
memory.” These are value-laden 
memories. William James has called 
our attention to the impact that these 
may have: “almost leave a scar on the 
cerebral tissue” (quoted in Siegel). 
Siegel also speaks of the vulnerability 
of some people while engaged in 
changing memories with some tech-
niques: “individuals can experience 
traumatic events and be unable to 
recall them explicitly later on.” There 
is also ‘delayed recall’; “the human 
mind is highly suggestible throughout 
life, and the accuracy of memory can 
be distorted by a number of factors 
including drug states, hypnosis, and 
intense and repeated questioning 
within certain forms of interroga-
tions.” “Memory is sociable and sug-
gestible.” He adds that “actual events 
can be forgotten, and non-
experienced ‘recollections’ can be 
deeply felt to be true memo-
ries” (P.80).  
 
VI.a Reconsolidation of memory 
 
 A review of classical notions of 
memories dating back thousands of 
years and an excursion into the current 
notions of memory in neurosciences in 
general do not appear to contradict 
each other. But popular notions of 
what is memory do appear to diverge 
from philosophical and scientific no-
tions. Siegel has addressed some of 
these divergences with clear ethical 
connotations. An important new notion 
in the neuroscience of memory is the 
notion of reconsolidation of memory in 
contrast to the notion of extinction. 
Since Pavlov, who coined the term 
only to find out its fallacy, we have 
been under the impression that memo-
ries can be extinguished. But, as Pav-
lov saw his dogs during the bombing 
of St. Petersburg and later Greg Quirk 
in his rats in Puerto Rico, the extin-
guished memories return under stress.  
It appeared then that Freud was right in 
calling them defense mechanisms of 
“repression, suppression, etc.” That is, 
learning in the form of explicit or im-
plicit memories remains underneath 
conscious awareness only to reappear 
under certain circumstances. Only re-
cently with studies of Hector Maldona-
do in Argentina and others researchers 
have we become aware that it is possi-
ble to destabilize memories to the 
point of making them likely to change 
permanently.  
 These laboratory procedures have 
been carried out in animals and in hu-
man and they are called memory re-
consolidation. Clinicians have been 
adapting these ideas and implementing 
them in the work with their patients. 
They have claimed beneficial results 
(Ecker 2012).  
 
VII. Therapeutic Action as an Ethical 
Method: Aquinas, Blondel and Janet 
 
 Finally, is it ethical to change 
memories when we are based in reality 
and knowing as much as we can about 
the object of our exploration at a given 
moment?  
 The answer is not to opt for sub-
jectivity or objectivity but for integra-
tion. We are in a climate of scientific 
polarization- subjectivism and objec-
tivism –where the bonds that used to 
unite them are broken. The reason be-
hind it is the fragmentation in science 
achieved by the unlinking of the two 
legitimate processes of technology 
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(favored by modern science) and art 
(favored by many clinicians). The se-
vere antithesis — modernism and post-
modernism — that we live with could 
possibly be solved by the Blondelian 
restoration of agency- synergism -
through the philosophy of action which 
is integrative, and by Pierre Janet’s psy-
chology of action which pays attention 
to the core organizers of personal expe-
rience. As such, to incorporate into 
medical technology the mission of the 
physician “to touch carefully and re-
sponsively feeling the patient’s body so 
it can detect strains and tensions which 
can perhaps help to confirm or correct 
the patient’s own subjective localiza-
tion, that is the patient’s experience of 
pain” (Gadamer). He continues, “What 
is important is to recognize the other in 
their otherness, as opposed, for exam-
ple, to the tendency towards standardi-
zation promoted by modern technolo-
gy…” (p.108). Finally, “the goal of the 
art of medicine is to heal the patient and 
it is clear that healing does not lie with-
in the jurisdiction of the doctor but ra-
ther of nature. Doctors know that they 
are only in a position to provide ancil-
lary help to nature….therapeia, mean-
ing service. (p 128).” Gadamer exam-
ines the mixed position of medicine: 
both a natural science and an art impos-
sible to fit in a modern world.   In fami-
ly therapy we follow the wisdom of S. 
Minuchin when he says: “the sense of 
belonging dominates the experience of 
being.” In other words, to be is to be-
long.   
 Morality and the science of ethics 
is the tip of the iceberg-so to speak- of 
philosophy. Even with its own general 
principles, ethics basically deals with 
the concrete and particular situations of 
the daily life of people. But ethics’ gen-
eral principles depend, in turn, on the 
object and its knowledge, that is, on 
those two philosophical realms of ontol-
ogy and epistemology that leads us to 
establish the existence and knowledge 
of the object.  Furthermore, the philoso-
phy of action and the psychology of 
action provide the general foundations 
for a dynamic understanding of the 
study of the concrete and the particular 
by those professionals who practice the 
mixed art and science of health care 
(see Gadamer). That is the case because 
they both require an integrated method-
ology that includes not only the abstract 
and cognitive elements of interaction- 
so unfortunately typical of philosophy 
and modernist sciences, but also the 
personal involvement, the individual 
interaction of the psychiatrist and 
psychotherapist as both the preemi-
nent source and the outcome of re-
flection and not the other way 
around: action is the propeller of this 
activity and not thinking. We are used 
to Aristotle’s dictum: “Moral purpose 
is the origin of action. (NE 
6.2.1139a31-32)” But the purpose of 
the will is already a movement- a 
previous setting in motion- by an 
earlier external material cause.  
 The medieval study of acts by 
Aquinas helps clarify these points.  
Aquinas’ transcendentals clarify the 
object of study by defining the gen-
eral ground on which to base our 
study of reality. The transcendentals 
are being [ens], thing [res], oneness
[unum], identity [aliquid], truth
[verum], and goodness [bonum] 
(Aquinas 1994). The first three are 
considered absolute while the last 
three are relative to each other. The 
latter are not only relative but also 
have the outmost importance to eth-
ics. Of foremost importance is the 
definition of truth about reality. It is 
defined elsewhere (Aquinas 1948) as 
‘adequation rei et intellectus’ “the 
equation of thought and thing” and 
also translated as “correspondence 
between the object and self-
consciousness (Giussani). Pieper ex-
plicates the term aliquid that “implies 
an essential relatedness of every be-
ing to another being. A specific kind 
of relatedness, in fact, is stated by the 
two principles of the truth and the 
goodness of all things, namely, the 
very being is oriented towards a 
knowing and loving (that is, willing) 
mind.” 
 The process of deliberation or 
consilium needs to be based on such 
anchoring at the risk of an unending 
stream of opinions (doxa) by the self 
or others or by linear mechanical dia-
lectic. In the natural world we ob-
serve such substantiation. In contrast 
with the mere cognitive process of 
deliberation aiming at the satisfaction 
and arrival of the end, the multiple 
perspectives of the transcendentals 
anchor and tame the wild dynamism 
of linear deliberation [consilium].  
 Hegel’s dialectical method con-
tributes to the clarification of how the 
process of reconsolidation of memo-
ries unfolds in the psychotherapeutic 
session and in specific during the 
deliberative process and especially 
during the activation of the mismatch-
ing of experiences.   
 The polarized dialectics seen in 
traumatic stress is usually described by 
those afflicted by it as a general sense 
of “being stuck” in the past experience 
and unable to be free to move into the 
present moment. This realization leads 
me to believe that we need to reex-
amine our ideas about time. Subjective 
time, that is, the way we agree to meas-
ure time is chronological time. In con-
trast, objective time is the way objects 
of reality change and has been called 
by the ancient Greeks by the name of 
kairos. For the traumatized person, but 
especially for those with profound 
forms of dissociation, time not only 
stops but also is moving in the virtual 
reality of the different mental states 
within the individual body.  During the 
clinical session to treat traumatic mem-
ories, we continually observe a process 
of spiraling up or down of the dialec-
tics- of somatic, emotional, cognitive, 
among others- during the reconsolida-
tion of memories. While they spiral 
exclusively up to further polarization 
the result is a tendency towards un-
healthier solutions. In general, waves 
of spiraling up and down became in-
creasingly attenuated while tending 
towards healthier solutions. This is the 
nature of the psychopathology while 
uncovering or activating the repressed 
memory.  
 Psychophysiological recording 
attests to the correct application of this 
philosophical principle in the natural 
sciences. For example, during a session 
of heart rate variability (HRV) biofeed-
back in a patient suffering from trau-
matic stress we can ascertain periods of 
relative calmness where the 
“coherence” (otherwise known as pow-
er, integration or synergism) is high. 
But during an intrusion of traumatic 
memory the synergism is disrupted and 
the relative contributions of the auto-
nomic nervous system are thrown out 
of synchrony and spread wide. The 
goal of the biofeedback session is to 
restore the healthy synchrony of the 
different physiological processes. 
Overall, the patient may end up experi-
encing a sense of wholeness with de-
creased dissociations, a sense of per-
sonal goodness and well-being, a sense 
of correspondence to true self, as well 
as a sense of interpersonal belonging.  
 In conclusion, the synergistic ac-
tivity- restoring bonds –between sci-
ences and with arts, along the classifi-
cation of the clarification of the onto-
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The Logic of the Broken 
 
Robyn R. Gaier, Ph.D. 
rrgaier@viterbo.edu 
 Some people attribute illogical 
thinking to those who suffer from de-
pression, when depression is under-
stood as a mental illness. It is not diffi-
cult to understand why illogical think-
ing is attributed to such persons. A 
person suffering from depression may 
believe that she has failed in her obli-
gations to her family and friends, for 
example, even when there is no or little 
evidence for this belief. Moreover, 
such a depressed person may hold onto 
her belief that she has failed in her ob-
ligations to others, even when con-
fronted with evidence to the contrary. 
As Aaron T. Beck and Brad A. Alford 
(2009) explained, there is “an astonish-
ing contrast between the depressed 
person’s image of him- or herself and 
the objective facts” (p. 3). They contin-
ued to explain that depressed persons 
“are not readily swayed by objective 
evidence or by logical demonstration 
of the unreasonable nature of” certain 
ideas (Ibid.). David D. Burns takes 
the attribution of illogical thinking in 
depressed persons a step further. In 
Burns’ book Feeling Good: The New 
Mood Therapy (1999), Burns writes:  
because depression has been 
viewed as an emotional disor-
der throughout the history of 
psychiatry, therapists from most 
schools of thought place a 
strong emphasis on “getting in 
touch” with your feelings. Our 
research reveals the unex-
pected: Depression is not an 
emotional disorder at all! The 
sudden change in the way you 
feel is of no more causal rele-
vance than a runny nose is 
when you have a cold. Every 
bad feeling you have is the re-
sult of your distorted negative 
thinking.  pessimistic attitudes 
play the central role in the de-
velopment and continuation of 
all your symptoms. (p. 28) 
 It seems as though the success of 
Cognitive Behavior Therapy has 
helped to reinforce the claim that 
persons who suffer from depression 
also suffer from illogical thinking, 
since this attribution is still prevalent. 
For example, in 2010, Michael W. 
Austin, a professor of philosophy at 
Eastern Kentucky University, wrote 
in an online post for Psychology To-
day that “there is at least good philo-
sophical evidence that sound critical 
thinking belongs in the toolbox of the 
person who is dealing with depres-
sion, as well as the toolbox of those 
who are seeking to help such an indi-
vidual.” Since sound critical thinking 
ought to be something everyone 
should strive to maintain, one might 
wonder why Professor Austin singles 
out those suffering from depression 
and their care providers. Austin ex-
plains that his “claim is not that un-
sound or illogical thinking is the 
cause of depression, or that the de-
pressed person is blameworthy for 
how she thinks, but rather that the 
thinking that is characteristic of 
someone suffering from depression is 
sometimes illogical thinking” (2010). 
In sum, Austin suggests that philoso-
phy (as a discipline) may be a ‘part 
of the cure’ for depression through 
the exercise of one’s critical thinking 
skills.   Like Austin, I believe that 
the discipline of philosophy does 
have an important contribution to make 
with respect to understanding and, pos-
sibly, to treating depression. But, un-
like Austin, I do not believe that phi-
losophy’s contribution is rooted in 
one’s toolbox of critical thinking skills. 
Rather, I wish to challenge the claim 
that persons with depression engage in 
illogical thinking by focusing upon 
how agency may be impaired through 
depression. I will begin by briefly ex-
amining a definition of “illogical” be-
fore proceeding to offer an account of 
how the stated beliefs and observed 
actions of persons suffering from de-
pression may appear to be illogical. I 
will conclude by highlighting a couple 
of the implications that follow if, in 
fact, the charge of illogical thinking 
among depressed persons is found 
wanting.   
 The charge of thinking illogically 
implies either that one has failed to 
apply the rules of logic, or that one has 
misapplied the rules of logic in a par-
ticular situation. Typically, it seems as 
though more attention is paid to what a 
depressed person counts as evidence 
for forming beliefs rather than how 
such a person reasons, given her re-
spective beliefs. If feelings of worth-
lessness are grounded in a depressed 
person’s false belief that she has failed 
in her obligations to family and friends, 
for instance, then one might say that 
she is committing the fallacy of sup-
pressed evidence. Now, for the sake of 
argument, I will jettison any idea of a 
causal relation between suppressing 
evidence and feelings of worthlessness. 
Even Austin acknowledges that illogi-
cal thinking is not the cause of depres-
sion, as noted above. Furthermore, the 
charge of illogical thinking does not 
imply that simply changing one’s 
thought patterns will treat her depres-
sion effectively. Rather, the idea here is 
that, for all practical purposes, it ap-
pears as though she is thinking illogi-
cally about matters concerning her life. 
 What I find particularly troubling 
with the charge that those suffering 
from depression engage in illogical 
thinking is that it is a descriptive claim 
that describes the phenomenon of de-
pression inaccurately. I believe that 
such a charge of illogical thinking fails 
in at least two ways. First, there are 
certain prerequisites to thinking logi-
cally that are being overlooked when 
the charge of illogical thinking is at-
tributed to the rational agency of a de-
pressed person. Second, even when 
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these prerequisites are accounted for, 
the charge of illogical thinking also 
fails to consider the complex interplay 
of desires, beliefs, emotions, and 
thoughts, as well as the possible role of 
second-order desires, in particular, 
with respect to rational agency. I will 
begin by noting just one of the prereq-
uisites to logical thinking.   
 Philosopher David Hume famous-
ly wrote in his work A Treatise of Hu-
man Nature (in Book II, Part III, Sec-
tion III) that “reason is, and ought only 
to be, a slave of the passions, and can 
never pretend to any other office than 
to serve and obey them” (1965, p. 
179). Hume’s point was that the rules 
of logic do not themselves determine 
what is (or even what should be) the 
objects or ends about which we reason. 
Whether Hume was correct to note that 
reason is submissive to one’s passions, 
however, is a topic for a different pro-
ject. The point that I wish to make here 
is simply that, even if logical thinking 
is not based upon one’s passions, de-
sires, or values, thinking logically is 
based upon a coherent, integrated, and 
relatively stable self-concept. To rea-
son according to the rules of logic im-
plies the ability to reflect upon poten-
tial consequences as well as to have a 
conception of a future self – indeed, to 
reason logically implies the ability to 
view oneself as an ‘other.’  
 Yet it is significant that those who 
suffer from depression seem to lack a 
future self-conception. For instance, 
Fredrik Svenaeus – a professor at the 
Centre for Studies in Practical 
Knowledge in Sweden – notes that 
“depression … alienates the self from 
the world of others and also from the 
future as something providing a mean-
ingful set of possibilities for the de-
pressed person” (2014, p. 15). More 
specifically, philosopher Julia Driver 
explains that depressed persons “lack 
the ability to properly or accurately 
predict their own future affective states 
with respect to relevant alternative 
courses of action” (2014, p. 134). The 
ability to make such predictions is re-
ferred to as affective forecasting. Driv-
er continues to explain that failures in 
affective forecasting have “[serious] 
negative implications for an agent’s 
ability to [plan effectively]” (Ibid.). In 
short, the ability to assess consequenc-
es and to consider relevant options is 
an ability presupposed when determin-
ing logical courses of action. But if an 
agent lacks the ability to predict his 
future affective states across a range 
of possibilities, then (regardless of 
what he does) it is inaccurate to de-
scribe his selected course of action 
by suggesting that he has failed to 
apply (or that he has misapplied) the 
rules of logic. Actions, after all, have 
a given end or goal – and determin-
ing whether and which goals to pur-
sue depends not upon the rules of 
logic but, rather, upon reliably pre-
dicting how one will feel about them 
in the future.    
 At this point, someone who 
maintains that illogical thinking is a 
characteristic of depression may ob-
ject. The issue, he might claim, re-
sides at a more fundamental level. 
Consider the example I noted earlier 
of someone who sincerely believes 
that she has failed in her obligations 
to her family and friends even when 
there is no or little evidence for this 
belief. What is deemed as illogical is 
not an action – nor is it how well this 
person might predict her future affec-
tive states. What is deemed illogical 
in this example is that the agent ap-
pears to be committing the fallacy of 
suppressed evidence. That is, she 
appears to be failing to acknowledge 
relevant evidence that is available to 
her. She is (in a significant way) dis-
engaged from what Beck and Alford 
would call “objective facts” about the 
world.  Yet there is at least another 
way to describe why the depressed 
person might believe that she has 
failed others despite available evi-
dence to the contrary. Rather than 
focusing upon how, or even whether, 
she is engaged with relevant objec-
tive facts about the world, I wish to 
focus upon the degree in which she is 
internally integrated – or how well 
she is engaged in a unified self-
concept. To illustrate what I have in 
mind, consider a rather common way 
in which someone may lack internal 
integration. Suppose, for instance, 
that a person smokes cigarettes. He 
smokes to relieve tension and he con-
tinues to smoke out of habit. In short, 
he has a first-order desire to smoke. 
But, when he reflects upon his first-
order desire, he desires that he did 
not have that desire. His second-
order desire is, therefore, inconsistent 
with his first-order desire.  
 From the reflective standpoint, 
he knows that smoking is bad for his 
health. His knowledge of the nega-
tive effects of smoking and his desire 
not to desire smoking might prompt 
him to invest in programs designed to 
help him quit smoking. In this way, his 
knowledge of the negative effects of 
smoking becomes motivational. But the 
extent to which his second-order desire 
succeeds in becoming the overriding 
motivation upon which he acts is, in 
part, determined by how well he is in-
ternally integrated – or, how well his 
first and second-order desires align. 
 If he continues to smoke, then he 
is not simply suppressing evidence that 
smoking has negative effects on his 
health but, more accurately, he is not 
sufficiently motivated by this 
knowledge. With respect to nicotine (or 
other addicting substances), not being 
sufficiently motivated to quit does not 
mean that he lacks willpower since his 
voluntary choice to smoke is neverthe-
less unfree. Again, I wish to suggest 
here that the claim that illogical think-
ing is characteristic of depressed per-
sons in virtue of their depression is 
misguided. The alternative description 
that I propose does not focus upon a 
person’s thought processes or affective 
states – but, rather, upon what moti-
vates a person to form particular be-
liefs.  So, let’s return to the example 
of the depressed person who appears to 
be committing the fallacy of sup-
pressed evidence. One way to describe 
her belief that she has failed others is 
that she is aware of the relevant objec-
tive facts to the contrary but that she 
suppresses such evidence in her belief 
formation. Indeed, prima facie, it ap-
pears as though her false belief is the 
result of a confirmation bias – that is, a 
defect in the way in which she process-
es ‘objective facts.’ Somewhat ironical-
ly, Beck and Alford’s observation that 
depressed persons “are not readily 
swayed by objective evidence” may 
suggest another way to describe her 
false-belief formation. That is, being 
unmotivated by particular evidence 
might occur not only as a result of a 
cognitive bias (which may impair one’s 
reasoning processes) but also as a re-
sult of lacking internal integration. As 
in the example of the smoker as I have 
described above, it would be inaccurate 
to claim that such a smoker is engaged 
in illogical thinking when he smokes. 
After all, he is aware of the objective 
facts regarding the potential, negative 
consequences of continued smoking, 
and he has some motivation to change 
his first-order desire to continue to 
smoke. But his first and second-order  
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desires do not align. His will is divided.  
 It is interesting that depressed per-
sons also have been characterized as 
having a divided will. For example, a 
study published in the Proceedings of 
the National Academy of the Sciences 
found that depressed persons had much 
more difficulty in sustaining positive 
emotions when presented with positive 
images than what they were is sustain-
ing negative emotions when presented 
with negative images (Heller et al, 
2009). The authors of that study ex-
plain a rather humbling but com-
monsensical point – namely, that  
in everyday life, individuals do 
not generally encounter uninter-
rupted positive stimuli. Negative 
experiences often intermix with 
positive ones, and the ability of 
individuals to heighten and main-
tain positive affect in the face of 
negative stimuli is vitally im-
portant for health and well-being. 
(p. 22449) 
 
To which I would add that, more spe-
cifically, the ability to maintain posi-
tive affect plays a vitally important role 
in a person’s belief formation. Citing 
the same study, Julia Driver further 
explains that depressed persons “realize 
that there is something wrong with 
their responses, and often feel motivat-
ed to do something about it” (2014, p. 
131). Hence, for such persons, their 
wills are divided insofar as their moti-
vational states do not align.  
 Still, someone might wonder about 
the significance of attuning more to a 
depressed person’s motivational states 
rather than to her thought processes. 
After all, suppose that a non-depressed 
person is presented with objective facts 
that her husband is having an affair. 
For the sake of argument, let’s further 
suppose that she suppresses such evi-
dence because she is unable to accept 
and, hence, does not desire to 
acknowledge such evidence. Might we 
say that she is unmotivated to account 
for these objective facts in the same 
way that a depressed person may be 
unmotivated to account for the objec-
tive facts that count against her belief 
that she has failed others? Aren’t both 
instances glaring examples of cognitive 
biases at play?   
 My answer to these questions is a 
resounding ‘no.’ There is an element of 
self-deception that is present in the case 
of the wife’s belief formation, which 
is absent in the depressed person’s 
belief formation. Unlike the wife, 
when the depressed person believes 
that she has failed in her obligations 
to others, it is inaccurate to describe 
her as suppressing evidence to the 
contrary. Rather, it seems as though 
the lingering negative affect that she 
suffers upon experiencing negative 
stimuli influences her motivational 
states and, thereby, makes her belief 
that she has failed others feel strong-
er than the belief that she has not. It 
is unsurprising, then, that she is “not 
readily swayed … by logical demon-
stration,” as Beck and Alford ob-
served above, since motivational 
states may precede the employment 
of the rules of logic.       
 In this respect, I believe that 
attention to studies about the nature 
of autism may provide a helpful anal-
ogy here. Prima facie those who suf-
fer from moderately severe instances 
of autism appear to lack empathy. 
More boldly, someone either unedu-
cated or unfamiliar with autism 
might believe that a person with au-
tism is being cold-hearted, or simply 
that he does not know how to act 
around others when he, for example, 
fails to comfort another person when 
able to do so. But describing persons 
with autism as characteristically cold
-hearted or even as simply lacking in 
empathy is inaccurate. The descrip-
tion is inaccurate because the social 
impairment that is characteristic of 
those with autism interferes with the 
way in which they experience situa-
tions. Philosopher Elenore Stump 
explains: 
 what … researchers [of autism] 
 are struggling to describe is one 
 person’s knowledge of another 
 and of that other’s mental states 
 when the knowledge in ques-
 tion shares features … of cer-
 tain kinds of perception. Like 
 the perception of color, for ex-
 ample, the knowledge at issue 
 here is direct, intuitive, and 
 hard to translate …. For in
 stance, John knows that Mary 
 is  going to give him a flower 
 be cause he first knows Mary, 
 her  action, her emotion, 
 and her intention – but these 
 are things  which he knows 
 by, as it were,  seeing them, 
 and not by cognizing them 
 ….” (2010, pp. 70-71).  
    
 In short, the ability to read social 
cues impacts one’s ability to respond to 
others in ways deemed to be socially 
appropriate. Appreciation of this im-
pact is central to understanding autism. 
The recognition that those with autism 
are not characteristically lacking in 
empathy has not only advanced a more 
accurate understanding of what those 
with autism are experiencing but, I 
believe, that it has also helped to ad-
vance more compassionate ways of 
treating those with autism. Similarly, 
the recognition that those who suffer 
from depression are not somehow more 
prone to illogical thinking than the rest 
of the population is deserving of atten-
tion.   
 So, in conclusion, I briefly wish to 
mention why I believe that both studies 
in psychiatry and contemporary philo-
sophical works – particularly in moti-
vation and in agency – should be com-
bined to put forth a more accurate de-
scription of how beliefs are formed 
among those who suffer from depres-
sion. Firstly, because the same word 
“depression” is used to describe both a 
mental illness as well as a natural and 
healthy reaction to life’s disappoint-
ments (which everyone who is fortu-
nate to live long enough will experi-
ence), describing a depressed person’s 
belief-formation process in an accurate 
way may help to provide the much-
needed grounds for differentiating 
among these experiences. In other 
words, I am not denying that perhaps 
someone who experiences a disappoint-
ment in life, and who subsequently 
feels depressed might be thinking illog-
ically. I only wish to deny that this is 
true when depression is understood as a 
mental illness. Secondly, as in the con-
temporary understanding of autism, a 
refined notion of a depressed person’s 
belief states might help to reduce the 
social stigma against those who are 
living with depression. Thirdly, there 
might be implications for the treatment 
of depression by focusing attention on 
a depressed person’s motivational 
states and their potential need for a 
unified self-conception. For all of these 
reasons, I believe that it is important to 
challenge the attribution of illogical 
thinking as a characteristic of those 
who suffer from depression. 
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coverage of stimulants while those 
with probable ADHD are denied?  In 
psychiatry we talk about subclinical 
presentations of disorders, such as 
the patient with anorexia whose 
weight is 87% of her ideal body 
weight, rather than the DSM thresh-
old of 85% of ideal body weight.  It 
seems counterintuitive to diagnose 
this person with “probable anorexia” 
if she meets the other criteria for 
anorexia diagnosis. It is also counter-
productive if the probable diagnosis 
prevents the patient from accessing 
entitlements or services provided to 
the “established” sick.  
I will be interested to follow 
what happens with the tiered diagno-
sis of PD.  Will there be a flurry of 
productive research if cohorts consist 
of patients with more homogeneous 
presentations?  Will services be of-
fered or withheld based on the the 
diagnostic tier?  Will probable PD 
serve any purpose at all? 
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ment over accommodation.  Kavanagh 
emphasizes the conflict between ‘cure’ 
and accommodation (while also recog-
nizing possible collaboration), while 
Kruger, who spends much of his article 
describing the particular deficits in 
autism, is less concerned about conflict 
and emphasizes that the high-
functioning Asperger’s individual 
needs both treatment and societal ac-
commodation.  
 Finally, in “The Logic of the Bro-
ken, ”Robyn Gaier challenges the no-
tion that depression should be de-
scribed as a failure of rational thinking, 
as in the theory of Cognitive Behavior-
al Therapy (CBT). She argues that the 
depressive doesn’t suffer from irration-
al thinking so much as from a lack of 
self-integration and conflicted and un-
integrated motivations.  At the end of 
her article she joins the discussion of 
autism, pointing out that just as the 
depressed might incur less stigma if not 
viewed as irrational, so also  autistics 
might incur less stigma if viewed as 
suffering from a social impairment as 
opposed to simply lacking in empathy.  
 If there is a common element in 
these papers, it is an effort to propose 
alternative viewpoints on psychiatric 
disorders. Bedrick suggests looking at 
epidemiological differences in depres-
sion from the perspective of positive 
freedom. Vilaro proposes seeing post-
traumatic stress from the angle of Aris-
totelian form. Kavanaugh and Kruger 
put forward another understanding of 
high-functioning autism if addressed 
from concerns about social justice. And 
finally Gaier suggests another under-
standing of depression than that of irra-
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